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Towards applied theories based on computability logic
Giorgi Japaridze
Abstract
Computability logic (CL) is a recently launched program for redeveloping logic as a formal theory of
computability, as opposed to the formal theory of truth that logic has more traditionally been. Formulas
in it represent computational problems, “truth” means existence of an algorithmic solution, and proofs
encode such solutions. Within the line of research devoted to finding axiomatizations for ever more
expressive fragments of CL, the present paper introduces a new deductive system CL12 and proves
its soundness and completeness with respect to the semantics of CL. Conservatively extending classical
predicate calculus and offering considerable additional expressive and deductive power, CL12 presents a
reasonable, computationally meaningful, constructive alternative to classical logic as a basis for applied
theories. To obtain a model example of such theories, this paper rebuilds the traditional, classical-logic-
based Peano arithmetic into a computability-logic-based counterpart. Among the purposes of the present
contribution is to provide a starting point for what, as the author wishes to hope, might become a new
line of research with a potential of interesting findings — an exploration of the presumably quite unusual
metatheory of CL-based arithmetic and other CL-based applied systems.
MSC: primary: 03F50; secondary: 03F30; 03D75; 03F50; 68Q10; 68T27; 68T30
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1 Introduction
Computability logic (CL) is a semantical platform and program for redeveloping logic as a formal theory of
computability, as opposed to a formal theory of truth which logic has more traditionally been. It sees formulas
as interactive computational problems viewed as games played by a machine (⊤) against the environment
(⊥), where logical operators stand for operations on games and “truth” is understood as existence of an
algorithmic winning strategy. Numerous papers [1]-[14] have been published on this subject in recent years,
and the present reader is assumed to be familiar with the basic philosophy, motivations and techniques of
CL. Otherwise, he or she is recommended to take a look at the first 10 sections of [13] for an introduction
and survey.
So far all technical efforts within the CL project have been focused on developing CL as a pure logic,
typically through constructing axiomatizations for various fragments of it. The contribution presented in
the first part of this paper is in the same style. It introduces a new reduction operation •–≀≀ , similar to the
earlier known ◦– but stronger in that the antecedent is allowed to be replicated only a finite number of
times. With •–≀≀ syntactically treated as a separator of the two parts of a sequent, a sequent-calculus-style
deductive system CL12 is then constructed, and a proof of its soundness and completeness with respect
to the semantics of CL is provided. All atoms of the language of CL12 are elementary, and its logical
vocabulary, other than •–≀≀ , contains the earlier known ¬, ∧ , ∨ , ⊓ , ⊔ , ∀, ∃,⊓,⊔.
It should however be remembered that the ultimate purpose of logic is providing an intellectual tool for
navigating the real life. As such, first and foremost it should be able to successfully serve as a basis for
applied (substantial) theories. The possibility and expediency of basing applied theories on CL has been
repeatedly pointed out in earlier papers ([1, 4, 6, 13]), but no concrete attempts had been undertaken to
do so until now. The second part of the present article makes long overdue (by the standards of the young
but rapidly evolving CL) initial steps in this direction — the direction which appears to be full of promise,
mystery and the excitement of upturning virgin soil. For the first time in the history of the project, it
constructs a computability-logic-based applied theory, specifically, Peano arithmetic based on CL12 instead
of classical logic. This system, named CLA1, is meant to be a model example of a theory of this kind,
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and a starting point for future explorations that, as the author has reasons to believe, may result in some
interesting findings.
Generally, the nonlogical axioms of a computability-logic-based applied theory would be any collection of
(formulas expressing) problems whose algorithmic solutions are known. Sometimes, together with nonlogical
axioms, we may also have nonlogical rules of inference, preserving the property of computability. An example
of such a rule is the constructive induction rule of CLA1. Then, the soundness of the corresponding
underlying axiomatization of CL (such as CL12 in the present case) — which usually comes in the strong
form called uniform-constructive soundness — guarantees that every theorem T of the theory also has an
algorithmic solution and that, furthermore, such a solution can be effectively constructed from a proof of T .
Does not this look like exactly what the constructivists have been calling for?!
On the applied side, the above fact makes CL-based theories problem-solving tools: finding a solution for
a given problem reduces to expressing the problem in the language of the theory, and finding a proof of that
problem. An algorithmic solution for the problem then automatically comes together with such a proof.
2 The dfb-reduction operation, informally
As noted, the reader is assumed to be familiar with the basics of CL. Any unknown or forgotten terms and
symbols used here can be looked up in [13], which comes with a convenient glossary.1
Consider the problem ⊓x⊔y(y = x2). Anyone who knows the definition of x2 (but perhaps does not
know the definition of x× y, or is unable to compute the multiplication function for whatever reason) would
be able to solve the following problem, as it is about reducing the consequent to the antecedent:
⊓z⊓u⊔v(v = z × u) → ⊓x⊔y(y = x2). (1)
A machine’s winning strategy for the above goes like this. Wait till the environment specifies a value n for
x, i.e. asks “what is the square of n?”. Do not try to immediately answer this question, but rather specify
the same value n for both z and u, thus asking the counterquestion “what is n times n?”. The environment
will have to provide a correct answer m to this counterquestion, i.e., specify v as m where m = n×n, or else
it loses. Then, specify y as m, and rest your case. Note that, in this solution, the machine did not have to
compute multiplication, doing which had become environment’s responsibility. The machine only correctly
reduced the problem of computing square to the problem of computing product, which made it the winner.
Even though (1) expresses a “very easily solvable” problem, this formula is still not logically valid. The
success of the reduction strategy of the consequent to the antecedent that we provided for it relies on the
nonlogical fact that x2 = x×x. That strategy would fail in a general case where the meanings of x2 and x×x
may not necessarily be the same. On the other hand, the goal of CL as a general-purpose problem-solving
tool should be to allow us find purely logical solutions, i.e., solutions that do not require any special, domain-
specific knowledge and (thus) would be good no matter what the particular predicate or function symbols of
the formulas mean. Any knowledge that might be relevant should be explicitly stated and included either in
the antecedent of a given formula or in the set of axioms (“implicit antecedents” for every potential formula)
of a CL-based theory. In our present case, formula (1) easily turns into a logically valid one by adding, to
its antecedent, the definition of square in terms of multiplication:
∀w(w2 = w × w) ∧⊓z⊓u⊔v(v = z × u) → ⊓x⊔y(y = x2). (2)
The strategy that we provided for (1) is just as good for (2), with the difference that it is successful for (2)
no matter what x2 and z×u mean, whereas, in the case of (1), it was guaranteed to be successful only under
the standard arithmetic interpretations of the square and product functions.
Let us now look at the following modification of (2):
∀w
(
w3 = (w × w)× w
)
∧⊓z⊓u⊔v(v = z × u) → ⊓x⊔y(y = x3). (3)
1The glossary for the published version of [13] is given at the end of the book (rather than article), on pages 371-376. The
reader may instead use the preprint version of [13], available at http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.LO/0507045 The latter includes both
the main text and the glossary.
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Here is a pseudo-strategy for (3) in the style of the (real) strategy that we gave for (1) and (2). Wait
till the environment specifies a value n for x. Then, using the resource ⊓z⊓u⊔v(v = z × u) given in the
antecedent, make the environment compute m with m = n× n. Then, again using the same resource, make
the environment further compute m× n, and use the resulting value to specify y in the consequent.
Of course, there was some cheating here. Namely, after the first usage of ⊓z⊓u⊔v(v = z×u), it will have
evolved to the elementary game m = n × n and hence will be no longer available as a product-computing
resource. The above pseudo-strategy works not for (3) but for the following, weaker problem, which has not
one but rather two copies of the product-computing resource in the antecedent:
∀w
(
w3 = (w × w) × w
)
∧⊓z⊓u⊔v(v = z × u) ∧⊓z⊓u⊔v(v = z × u) → ⊓x⊔y(y = x3).
In this particular case we got lucky in finding an easy way around, as computing cube only requires computing
product a fixed number of times, which can be accounted for by including, in the antecedent, the appropriate
number of copies of the relevant resource. But what if the problem was not about computing cube or square,
but rather computing xh for a (⊓-bound) variable h?
Here we see a need for considering a reduction operation that, unlike → , permits using the antecedental
resources any finite number of times. Several earlier-studied weak reduction operations, including ◦– and
>– , do allow repeated usage of the antecedent. But, imposing no restrictions on the quantity of repetitions
and thus permitting infinitely many reusages, for most purposes they turn out to be weaker than necessary.
At the same time, they tend to be very hard to tame syntactically/axiomatically. The operation •–≀≀ that
we introduce in this paper and call dfb-reduction appears to be semantically optimal in this respect, and
also syntactically better behaved.
It is applied to two components: ~A, called the antecedent, and B, called the succedent. The result is
written ~A •–≀≀ B. Here B is any game, while ~A is any finite sequence of games. More precisely, ~A is not really
a sequence but rather a binary tree with games at its leaves, as will be seen later from the strict definitions.
But, in the present informal explanation, we can safely ignore this technical detail and identify such a tree
with the sequence of the games at its leaves.
Intuitively, the meaning of
A1, . . . , An •–≀≀ B (4)
is similar to that of
A1 ∧ . . . ∧An→B, (5)
that is, the task of the machine is to win in B as long as the environment, playing in the role of ⊤, wins
against the machine (the latter playing in the role of ⊥) in each Ai. This amounts to solving problem B while
having the problems A1, . . . , An as computational resources. The difference between (4) and (5) is that, in
the former, the machine has the additional capability to replicate, at any time, any of the “conjuncts” of the
antecedent (in the form to which it has evolved by that time rather than in the original form), and insert the
new copy of it as a new “conjunct” next to the old copy. A restriction here is that the machine is allowed to
do such replications only a finite number of times, or else it will be considered to have lost the game.
As an aside, “dfb” stands for double-finite branching. One can define two other, similar but weaker
versions of reduction: single-finite branching (sfb) reduction •–≀ and (simply) finite branching (fb) reduction
•– . What makes •–≀ weaker than •–≀≀ is that, in the former, winning in the succedent automatically makes
⊤ the winner, even if it did infinitely many replications in the antecedent. And what makes •– further
weaker than •–≀ is that, in the former, it does not matter at all whether the machine has made finitely
or infinitely many replications; however, when determining the winner, only the copies of the antecedental
resources that emerged as a result of finitely many replications will be looked at. We will be exclusively
concerned with dfb-reduction in this paper, so sfb- and fb-reductions can be safely forgotten.
Expressions of the form ~A •–≀≀ B we call sequents. If ⊤ has an algorithmic winning strategy for the game
represented by such an expression, we say that B is dfb-reducible to ~A, and call such a strategy (just as
the problem ~A •–≀≀ B itself) a dfb-reduction of B to ~A. The following sequent represents the problem of
dfb-reducing the problem of computing cube to the problem of computing multiplication and the definition
of cube:
∀w
(
w3 = (w × w)× w
)
, ⊓z⊓u⊔v(v = z × u) •–≀≀ ⊓x⊔y(y = x3). (6)
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Here is a winning strategy for (6), which succeeds for any possible meanings of x3 and z × u, so not only
does (6) have an algorithmic solution, but, in fact, it is a logically valid sequent. The strategy is to first wait
till the environment picks a value n for x. This brings the game down to
∀w
(
w3 = (w × w) × w
)
, ⊓z⊓u⊔v(v = z × u) •–≀≀ ⊔y(y = n3).
Now the machine replicates the second resource of the antecedent, bringing the game down to
∀w
(
w3 = (w × w) × w
)
, ⊓z⊓u⊔v(v = z × u), ⊓z⊓u⊔v(v = z × u) •–≀≀ ⊔y(y = n3).
After this, the machine specifies both z and u as n in the second resource of the antecedent, further bringing
the game down to
∀w
(
w3 = (w × w)× w
)
, ⊔v(v = n× n), ⊓z⊓u⊔v(v = z × u) •–≀≀ ⊔y(y = n3).
To avoid a loss, the environment will have to respond by choosing a (correct) value m for v in the same
component, and the game evolves to
∀w
(
w3 = (w × w)× w
)
, m = n× n, ⊓z⊓u⊔v(v = z × u) •–≀≀ ⊔y(y = n3).
Now the machine specifies z and u as m and n in the third resource of the antecedent, bringing the game
down to
∀w
(
w3 = (w × w)× w
)
, m = n× n, ⊔v(v = m× n) •–≀≀ ⊔y(y = n3).
Again, the environment will have to respond by selecting a value k for v, and we get
∀w
(
w3 = (w × w) × w
)
, m = n× n, k = m× n •–≀≀ ⊔y(y = n3).
Finally, the machine specifies y as k and, having brought the play down to the following true elementary
game, celebrates victory:
∀w
(
w3 = (w × w)× w
)
, m = n× n, k = m× n •–≀≀ k = n3.
Note that the succedent of the above sequent is a logical consequence (in the classical sense) of the formulas
of the antecedent. This can be seen to imply that, as promised, the success of our strategy in no way depends
on the meanings of x3 and z × u, so that the strategy is, in fact, a “purely logical” solution. Again, among
the purposes of computability logic is to serve as a tool for finding such “purely logical” solutions, so that
it can be applied to any domain of study rather than specific domains such as that of arithmetic, and to
arbitrary meanings of nonlogical symbols rather than particular meanings such as that of the multiplication
function for the symbol ×.
Remember the concept of Turing reducibility. A function f(x) is said to be Turing reducible to functions
g1(x), . . . , gn(x) iff there is a Turing machine that computes f(x) with oracles for g1(x), . . . , gn(x). This is
easily seen to mean nothing but the dfb-reducibility of ⊓x⊔y
(
y = f(x)
)
to the sequence
⊓x⊔y
(
y = g1(x)
)
, . . . , ⊓x⊔y
(
y = gn(x)
)
.
Thus, dfb-reducibility is a conservative generalization of Turing reducibility. The former, of course, is more
general, as it is not limited to problems of the form ⊓x⊔y
(
y = h(x)
)
as Turing reducibility is.
3 Dfb-reduction and a few other concepts defined formally
Remember from [13] that a constant game is a pair A = (LrA,WnA), where LrA is the set of legal runs of
A and WnA is a function telling us which player (⊤ or ⊥) has won a given run. Further remember that the
letter ℘ is always used as a variable for players, and ℘ (sometimes written as ¬℘) means ℘’s adversary.
We also remind the reader the definition of the operation of prefixation:
Definition 3.1 Let A be a constant game and Φ a legal position of A. The game 〈Φ〉A is defined by:
Lr〈Φ〉A = {Γ | 〈Φ,Γ〉 ∈ LrA}; Wn〈Φ〉A〈Γ〉 =WnA〈Φ,Γ〉.
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We say that a constant game A is finite-depth iff there is an integer d such that no legal run of A
contains more than d (lab)moves. The smallest of such integers d is called the depth of A. An elementary
game is a game of depth 0.
Our main focus in this paper will be on finite-depth games. This restriction of focus makes many
definitions and proofs simpler. Namely, in order to define a game operation O(A1, . . . , An) applied to such
games,2 it suffices to specify the following:
(i) Who wins O(A1, . . . , An) if no moves are made, i.e., the value of Wn
O(A1,...,An)〈〉.
(ii) What are the initial legal (lab)moves, i.e., the elements of {℘α | 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrO(A1,...,An)}, and to what
game is O(A1, . . . , An) brought down after such an initial legal labmove ℘α is made. Recall that, by
saying that a given labmove ℘α brings a given game A down to B, we mean that 〈℘α〉A = B.
Then, the set of legal runs of O(A1, . . . , An) will be uniquely defined, and so will be the winner in every run
of the game. If, however, infinite legal runs may also occur, then the following additional stipulation will be
required:
(iii) How to determine the value of WnO(A1,...,An)〈Γ〉 when Γ is an infinite legal run of O(A1, . . . , An).
For instance, a few basic game operations of CL already known from the earlier literature, can be
(re)defined as follows:
Definition 3.2 Let A, B, A0, A1, . . . be finite-depth constant games, and n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}.
1. ¬A is defined by:
(i) Wn¬A〈〉 = ℘ iff WnA〈〉 = ℘.
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr¬A iff 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA. Such an initial legal labmove ℘α brings the game down to
¬〈℘α〉A.
2. A0 ⊓ . . . ⊓An is defined by:
(i) WnA0 ⊓ ... ⊓ An〈〉 = ⊤.
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA0 ⊓ ... ⊓ An iff ℘ = ⊥ and α = i ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Such an initial legal labmove ⊥i
brings the game down to Ai.
3. A0 ∧ . . . ∧An is defined by:
(i) WnA0 ∧ ... ∧ An〈〉 = ⊤ iff, for each i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, WnAi〈〉 = ⊤.
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA0 ∧ ... ∧ An iff α = i.β, where i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and 〈℘β〉 ∈ LrAi . Such an initial
legal labmove ℘i.β brings the game down to A0 ∧ . . . ∧Ai−1 ∧ 〈℘β〉Ai ∧Ai+1 ∧ . . . ∧An.
4. A0 ⊔ . . . ⊔An and A0 ∨ . . . ∨An are defined exactly as A0 ⊓ . . . ⊓An and A0 ∧ . . . ∧An, respectively,
only with “⊤” and “⊥” interchanged.
5. The infinite ⊓ -conjunction A0 ⊓A1 ⊓ . . . is defined exactly as A0 ⊓ . . . ⊓An, only with “i ∈ {0, 1, . . .}”
instead of “i ∈ {0, . . . , n}”. Similarly for the infinite version of ⊔ .
To define the (new, never studied before) operation •–≀≀ of dfb-reduction, we need some preliminaries.
What we call a tree of games is a structure defined inductively as an element of the smallest set satisfying
the following conditions:
• Every game A is a tree of games. The one-element sequence 〈A〉 is said to be the yield of such a tree,
and the address of A in this tree is the empty bit string.
2The same, in fact, holds for the wider class of games termed in [1] perifinite-depth. These are games with finite yet perhaps
arbitrarily long legal runs.
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• Whenever A is a tree of games with yield 〈A1, . . . , Am〉 and B is a tree of games with yield 〈B1, . . . , Bn〉,
the pair A ◦ B is a tree of games with yield 〈A1, . . . , Am, B1, . . . , Bn〉. The address of each Ai in this
tree is 0w, where w is the address of Ai in A. Similarly, the address of each Bi is 1w, where w is the
address of Bi in B.
Example: Where A,B,C,D are games, (A◦B)◦(C ◦(A◦D)) is a tree of games with yield 〈A,B,C,A,D〉.
The address of the first A of the yield, to which we may as well refer as the first leaf of the tree, is 00, the
address of the second leaf B is 01, the address of the third leaf C is 10, the address of the fourth leaf A is
110, and the address of the fifth leaf D is 111.
Note that ◦ is not an operation on games, but just a symbol used instead of the more common comma
to separate two parts of a pair. And a tree of games itself is not a game, but a collection of games arranged
into a certain structure, just as a sequence of games is not a game but a collection of games arranged as a
list.
For bit strings u and w, we will be writing u  w to indicate that u is a (not necessarily proper) prefix
(initial segment) of w.
Definition 3.3 Let A1, . . . , An, B be finite-depth constant games, and T be a tree of games with yield
〈A1, . . . , An〉 (n ≥ 1). Let w1, . . . , wn be the addresses of A1, . . . , An in T , respectively. The game T •–≀≀ B is
defined by:
(i) WnT •–≀≀ B〈〉 = ⊤ iffWnB〈〉 = ⊤ or, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n},WnAi〈〉 = ⊥. In other words,WnT •–≀≀ B〈〉 =
WnA1∧...∧An→B〈〉.
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrT •–≀≀ B iff one of the following conditions is satisfied:
1. ℘α = ℘S.β (here “S” stands for “succedent”), where 〈℘β〉 ∈ LrB. Such a labmove ℘S.β brings
the game down to T •–≀≀ 〈℘β〉B.
2. ℘α = ℘u.β, where u  wi for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and, for each i with u  wi, 〈℘β〉 ∈ Lr
Ai .
Such a labmove ℘u.β brings the game down to T ′ •–≀≀ B, where T ′ is the result of replacing Ai by
〈℘β〉Ai in T for each i with u  wi.
3. ℘α = ⊤wi:, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We call such a move a replicative (lab)move. It brings the
game down to T ′ •–≀≀ B, where T ′ is the result of replacing Ai by (Ai ◦Ai) in T .
(iii) If Γ is a legal run of T •–≀≀ B with infinitely many replicative moves (which is the only case when Γ can
and will be infinite), then WnT •–≀≀ B〈Γ〉 = ⊥.
Example 3.4 Let p, q, r, s be any propositions (elementary constant games). Let G be the following game:
(p ⊓ q) ⊓ (r ⊓ s) •–≀≀ p ∧
(
(q ⊓ r) ∧ (q ⊓ s)
)
.
And let Γ be the run
〈⊤:, ⊥S.1.1.1, ⊤0.1, ⊤0.1, ⊥S.1.0.0, ⊤1:, ⊤1.0, ⊤10.0, ⊤11.1〉.
Γ is a legal run of G. Below we trace, step by step, the effects of its moves on G.
The 1st (lab)move ⊤:, meaning replicating the (only) leaf of the antecedental tree, with the address of
that leaf being the empty bit string, brings G down to — in the sense that 〈⊤:〉G is — the following game:
(
(p ⊓ q) ⊓ (r ⊓ s)
)
◦
(
(p ⊓ q) ⊓ (r ⊓ s)
)
•–≀≀ p ∧
(
(q ⊓ r) ∧ (q ⊓ s)
)
.
The 2nd move ⊥S.1.1.1 of Γ, meaning making the move ⊥1.1.1 in the succedent, meaning making the
move ⊥1.1 in the right ∧ -conjunct of the succedent, meaning making the move ⊥1 in the right ∧ -conjunct
of the right ∧ -conjunct of the succedent, meaning selecting the right ⊓ -conjunct there, further brings the
game down to — in the sense that 〈⊤:,⊥S.1.1.1〉G is — the following game:
(
(p ⊓ q) ⊓ (r ⊓ s)
)
◦
(
(p ⊓ q) ⊓ (r ⊓ s)
)
•–≀≀ p ∧
(
(q ⊓ r) ∧ s
)
.
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The 3rd move ⊤0.1 of Γ, meaning making the move 1 in the 0-addressed leaf of the antecedental tree,
meaning selecting the right ⊓ -conjunct there, further brings the game down to — i.e., 〈⊤:,⊥S.1.1.1,⊤0.1〉G
is — the following game:
(r ⊓ s) ◦
(
(p ⊓ q) ⊓ (r ⊓ s)
)
•–≀≀ p ∧
(
(q ⊓ r) ∧ s
)
.
The 4th move ⊤0.1 further brings the game down to
s ◦
(
(p ⊓ q) ⊓ (r ⊓ s)
)
•–≀≀ p ∧
(
(q ⊓ r) ∧ s
)
.
The 5th move ⊥S.1.0.0 further brings the game down to
s ◦
(
(p ⊓ q) ⊓ (r ⊓ s)
)
•–≀≀ p ∧ (q ∧ s).
The 6th move ⊤1:, replicating the 1-addressed leaf of the antecedental tree, further brings the game down
to
s ◦
((
(p ⊓ q) ⊓ (r ⊓ s)
)
◦
(
(p ⊓ q) ⊓ (r ⊓ s)
))
•–≀≀ p ∧ (q ∧ s).
The 7th move ⊤1.0, whose effect is the same as the effect of the two consecutive moves ⊤10.0 and ⊤11.0
would be, further brings the game down to
s ◦
(
(p ⊓ q) ◦ (p ⊓ q)
)
•–≀≀ p ∧ (q ∧ s).
The 8th move ⊤10.0 further brings the game down to
s ◦
(
p ◦ (p ⊓ q)
)
•–≀≀ p ∧ (q ∧ s).
The last, 9th move ⊤11.1 further brings the game down to the eventual position/game 〈Γ〉G, which is
s ◦ (p ◦ q) •–≀≀ p ∧ (q ∧ s).
Note that this play is won by ⊤ no matter what particular propositions p, q, r and s are. If, however, the
run had stopped after the 8th move, it could have been lost by ⊤, namely, ⊤ would lose in case s and p are
true but q is false.
For the rest of this paper we fix two infinite sets of expressions: the set {v0, v1, . . .} of variables and the
set {0, 1, . . .} (decimal numerals) of constants. Without loss of generality here we assume that the above
collection of constants is exactly the universe of discourse — i.e., the set over which the variables range —
in all cases that we consider. As always, by a valuation we mean a function e that sends each variable
x to a constant e(x). In these terms, a classical predicate p can be understood as a function that sends
each valuation e to a proposition, i.e. constant predicate. Similarly, what we call a (simply) game sends
valuations to constant games. Here we reproduce a formal definition of this concept and associated notation
from [13]:
Definition 3.5 A game is a function A from valuations to constant games. We write e[A] (rather than
A(e)) to denote the constant game returned by A for valuation e. Such a constant game e[A] is said to be
an instance of A. For readability, we usually write LrAe and Wn
A
e instead of Lr
e[A] and Wne[A].
Where n is a natural number, we say that a game A is n-ary iff there is are n variables such that, for
any two valuations e1 and e2 that agree on all those variables, we have e1[A] = e2[A]. Generally, a game
that is n-ary for some n, is said to be finitary.
We say that a game A depends on a variable x iff there are two valuations e1, e2 that agree on all
variables except x such that e1[A] 6= e2[A]. An n-ary game thus depends on at most n variables. And
constant games are nothing but 0-ary games.
Just as the Boolean operations straightforwardly extend from propositions to all predicates, our opera-
tions ¬, ∧ , ∨ , → , ⊓ , ⊔ , •–≀≀ extend from constant games to all games. This is done by simply stipulating
that e[. . .] commutes with all of those operations, as well as with ◦: ¬A is the game such that, for every e,
e[¬A] = ¬e[A]; A ⊓B is the game such that, for every e, e[A ⊓B] = e[A] ⊓ e[B]; T •–≀≀ B is the game such
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that, for every e, e[T •–≀≀ B] = e[T ] •–≀≀ e[B], where e[T ] is the result of replacing in T every game A of the
yield by e[A]; etc. The operation of prefixation also extends to nonconstant games: whenever Φ is a legal
position of every instance of a game A, 〈Φ〉A should be understood as the unique game such that, for every
e, e[〈Φ〉A] = 〈Φ〉e[A].
We remind the reader that the choice quantifiers can be defined as follows:
⊓xA(x) =def A(0) ⊓A(1) ⊓A(2) ⊓ . . . ;
⊔xA(x) =def A(0) ⊔A(1) ⊔A(2) ⊔ . . . .
A game A is said to be unistructural iff, for any two valuations e1 and e2, we have Lr
A
e1
= LrAe2 . Of
course, all constant or elementary games are unistructural. It can also be easily seen that all our game
operations preserve the unistructural property of games. For the purposes of the present paper, considering
only unistructural games would be sufficient.
A unistructural game is said to be finite-depth iff so are all of its instances. We (re)define the remaining
operations ∀ and ∃ only for unistructural, finite-depth games:
Definition 3.6 Let A(x) be a unistructural, finite-depth game.
1. ∀xA(x) is defined by stipulating that, for every valuation e and move α, we have:
(i) Wn∀xA(x)e 〈〉 = ⊤ iff, for every constant c, Wn
A(c)
e 〈〉 = ⊤.
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr∀xA(x)e iff 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr
A(x)
e . Such an initial legal labmove ℘α brings the game
e[∀xA(x)] down to e[∀x〈℘α〉A(x)].
2. ∃xA(x) is defined in exactly the same way, only with ⊤ and ⊥ interchanged.
4 Block-move machines
As always, we agree that the term “computational problem”, or simply “problem”, is a synonym of
“static game” (see Section 12 for a definition). All meaningful and reasonable examples of games — including
all elementary games — are static, and the class of static games is closed under all of our game operations.
This fact for •–≀≀ is proven in the appendix-style Section 12 of the present paper, and for all other operations
it has been proven in [1] (Theorem 14.1).
The paper [1] defines two models of interactive computation, called the hard-play machine (HPM) and the
easy-play machine (EPM). We remind the reader that both are sorts of Turing machines with the capability
of making moves, and have three tapes: the ordinary read/write work tape, and the read-only valuation
and run tapes. The valuation tape contains a full description of some valuation e, and its content remains
fixed throughout the work of the machine. In this paper we only consider finitary games, and a simplifying
assumption that we are making is that the valuation tape only lists the values of finitely many (relevant)
variables, the rest of the tape being blank, and the value of e at all unlisted variables assumed to be 0. As
for the run tape, it serves as a dynamic input, at any time spelling the current position. Every time one of
the players makes a move, that move — with the corresponding label — is automatically appended to the
content of this tape. In the HPM model, there is no restriction on the frequency of environment’s moves.
In the EPM model, on the other hand, the machine has full control over the speed of its adversary: the
environment can (but is not obligated to) make a (one single) move only when the machine explicitly allows
it to do so — the event that we call granting permission. The only “fairness” requirement that such a
machine is expected to satisfy is that it should grant permission every once in a while; how long that “while”
lasts, however, is totally up to the machine. The HPM and EPM models seem to be two extremes, yet,
according to Theorem 17.2 of [1], they yield the same class of winnable static games. The present paper will
only deal with the EPM model, so let us take a little closer look at it.
Let M be an EPM. A configuration of M is defined in the standard way: this is a full description of the
(“current”) state of the machine, the locations of its three scanning heads and the contents of its three tapes.
The initial configuration on valuation e is the configuration whereM is in its start state, the valuation tape
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spells e, each scanning head is looking at the first cell of the corresponding tape, and the work and run tapes
are empty. A configuration C′ is said to be a successor of configuration C in M if C′ can legally follow C in
the standard — standard for multitape Turing machines — sense, based on the transition function (which we
assume to be deterministic) of the machine and accounting for the possibility of nondeterministic updates —
depending on what move ⊥ makes or whether it makes a move at all — of the content of the run tape when
M grants permission. Technically, granting permission happens by entering one of the specially designated
states called “permission states”. And M makes a move α by constructing it at the beginning of its work
tape and then entering one of the specially designated states called “move states”. A computation branch
of M on e is a sequence of configurations of M where the first configuration is the initial configuration on e
and every other configuration is a successor of the previous one. Thus, the set of all computation branches on
e captures all possible scenarios (on valuation e) corresponding to different behaviors by ⊥. Such a branch
is said to be fair iff permission is granted infinitely many times in it. Each computation branch B of M
incrementally spells — in the obvious sense — a run Γ on the run tape, which we call the run spelled by
B. Then, for a game A, we writeM |=e A and say thatM wins A on valuation e to mean that, whenever
Γ is the run spelled by some computation branch B ofM on e and Γ is not ⊥-illegal,3 then branch B is fair
and WnAe 〈Γ〉 = ⊤. We write M |= A and say that M wins (computes, solves) A iff M |=e A for every
valuation e. Finally, we write |= A and say that A is computable iff there is an EPM M with M |= A.
The class of static games is robust with respect to choosing different models of computation or different
modes of playing games. Specifically, procedural decisions regarding whether players are allowed to move
at any time (as in the HPM model), or only when ⊤ so decides (as in the EPM model), or only when ⊥
so decides, or whether they should take alternating turns, do not affect the class of winnable static games.
Further, if the players move in an alternating order, it turns out to be irrelevant which player starts the
game, or how many moves at a time either player is allowed to make.
In the present paper, together with the EPM model, we will also be using the new (never defined before)
model of interactive computation that we call BMEPM (“Block-Move EPM”). A BMEPM is the same as
an EPM, with the only difference that here either player can make any finite number of moves at once.
That is, the machine can make several moves on a given clock cycle (say, by first listing those moves on
its work tape and then entering a move state); and the environment, too, can make any finite number of
moves (including no moves at all) when granted permission. All concepts and notations that we use for
EPMs straightforwardly extend to BMEPMs as well. The following proposition officially establishes the
equivalence between EPMs and BMEPMs for static games:
Proposition 4.1 A static game A is computable (i.e., there is an EPM that wins A) iff there is a BMEPM
that wins A. Furthermore:
1. There is an effective procedure that converts any BMEPM M into an EPM E such that, for any static
game A and any valuation e, if M |=e A, then E |=e A.
2. And vice versa: there is an effective procedure that converts any EPM E into a BMEPM M such that,
for any static game A and any valuation e, if E |=e A, then M |=e A.
Proof. Clause 1: Consider an arbitrary BMEPM M. The corresponding EPM E is a machine that,
with a valuation e spelled on its valuation tape, works by simulating M with the same e spelled on the
imaginary valuation tape of the latter. Every time this simulation shows that M grants permission, E also
grants permission, and then feeds the environment’s response (which can be a single move or no move) back
to the simulated M. And, every time the simulation shows that M makes a block α1, . . . , αn of moves,
E makes the same n moves — only, one by one rather than the whole block at once — in its real play.
Obviously, the run Γ generated by E in this play is a run that could have been generated by M (in precise
terms, Γ is the run spelled by some computation branch of M on e). So, if M wins a game A on valuation
e, so does E .
Clause 2: Consider an arbitrary EPM E . The corresponding BMEPM M is a machine that, with e
spelled on its valuation tape, works by simulating E with the same e spelled on the valuation tape of the
latter. Every time this simulation shows that E makes a move,M makes the same move. And every time the
simulation shows that E grants permission, so does M. If, in response, the environment makes no move, or
makes a single move, then the same response is fed back to the simulated E . Suppose now the environment
3Remember that a ℘-illegal run is an illegal run where the last move of the shortest illigal initial segment is ℘-labeled.
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responds by a block α1, . . . , αn of moves (n ≥ 2). In this case,M feeds back the response α1 to the simulated
E . It continues simulation (mimicking E ’s moves in its real play) until E grants permission again, in which
case M (without granting permission in the real play) simply feeds the environment’s earlier response α2
into the simulation, and so on until all of the n moves are processed in the same manner, after which M
resumes the ordinary simulation. It is not hard to see that the run ∆ generated in this play by M is a
⊤-delay of the run Γ generated by the simulated E . So, if E wins a static game A on valuation e, so does
M. ✷
5 Formulas and sequents
The first-order language of (the fragment of) CL that we consider in this section has infinitely many variables
and constants — the ones fixed in Section 3. Next, it has infinitely many n-ary nonlogical predicate symbols
and n-ary function symbols for each integer n ≥ 0. Finally, it has one binary logical predicate symbol =.
Terms are defined in the usual way, and so are formulas, except that the connectives now are ⊤,⊥ (0-ary),
¬ (1-ary), ∧ , ∨ , ⊓ , ⊔ (2-ary), and the quantifiers are ∀, ∃,⊓,⊔. Also, ¬ is only allowed on atomic formulas.
In any other case it should be understood as a standard abbreviation, and so should → . The definitions of
free and bound occurrences of variables are also standard, with ⊓,⊔ acting as quantifiers along with ∀, ∃.
Trees of formulas are the elements of the smallest set of expressions such that:
• The empty expression is a tree of formulas, said to be empty.
• Every formula is a (nonempty) tree of formulas.
• If T and S are nonempty trees of formulas, then so is (T ) ◦ (S). Here parentheses can be omitted
around T and S if they are formulas.
As in the case of trees of games, the yield of a tree of formulas is the sequence of formulas appearing in
it, in the left to right order. The yield of the empty tree is empty. We will often write a tree T of formulas
as T (E1, . . . , En) to indicate that E1, . . . , En is its yield. When n = 0, T (E1, . . . , En) is the empty tree.
A sequent is T (E1, . . . , En) •–≀≀ F (n ≥ 0), where T (E1, . . . , En), called the antecedent, is a tree of
formulas, and F , called the succedent, is a formula. When n = 0, such a sequent simply looks like •–≀≀ F ,
and is said to be an empty-antecedent sequent.
Sometimes a formula F will be represented as F (x1, . . . , xn), where the xi are pairwise distinct variables.
When doing so, we do not necessarily mean that each such xi has a free occurrence in F , or that every variable
occurring free in F is among x1, . . . , xn. In the context set by the above representation, F (t1, . . . , tn) will
mean the result of replacing, in F , each free occurrence of each xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) by term ti. The same
notational conventions also apply to sequents and trees of formulas.
An interpretation4 is a function ∗ that sends each n-ary function symbol f to a function f∗ : {0, 1, 2, . . .}n
→ {0, 1, 2, . . .}; it also sends each n-ary predicate symbol p to an n-ary elementary game p∗(x1, . . . , xn) which
does not depend on any variables other than x1, . . . , xn; the additional condition required to be satisfied
by ∗ is that =∗ is an equivalence relation on {0, 1, 2, . . .} preserved by f∗ for each function symbol f , and
respected by p∗ for each nonlogical predicate symbol p.5
The above uniquely extends to a mapping that sends each term t to a function t∗, each formula F to a
game F ∗, each nonempty tree T of formulas to a tree T ∗ of games, and each sequent X to a game X∗ by
stipulating that:
1. x∗ = x (any variable x).
2. c∗ = c (any constant c).
3. Where f is an n-ary function symbol and t1, . . . , tn are terms,
(
f(t1, . . . , tn)
)∗
= f∗(t∗1, . . . , t
∗
n).
4. Where p is an n-ary predicate symbol and t1, . . . , tn are terms,
(
p(t1, . . . , tn)
)∗
= p∗(t∗1, . . . , t
∗
n).
4The concept of an interpretation in CL is usually more general than the present one, where interpretations in our present
sense are called perfect. But here we omit the word “perfect” as we do not consider any nonperfect interpretations, anyway.
5More commonly classical logic simply treats = as the identity predicate. That treatment of =, however, is known to be
equivalent — in every respect relevant for us — to our present one. Namely, the latter turns into the former by seeing any two
=∗-equivalent constants as two different names of the same object of the universe, as “Evening Star” and “Morning Star” are.
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5. ∗ commutes with ◦, in the sense that (E ◦ F )∗ = E∗ ◦ F ∗.
6. ∗ commutes with •–≀≀ when the antecedent is not empty: (T •–≀≀ F )∗ = T ∗ •–≀≀ F ∗.
7. An empty-antecedent sequent is simply understood as its succedent: ( •–≀≀ F )∗ = F ∗.
8. ∗ commutes with all remaining operators: ⊤∗ = ⊤, (¬F )∗ = ¬F ∗, (E ∧ F )∗ = E∗ ∧ F ∗, (⊓xF )∗ =
⊓x(F ∗), etc.
When O∗ = P (whether O be a predicate symbol, function symbol, formula or sequent), we say that ∗
interprets O as P . If we say “O under interpretation ∗”, what we mean is O∗.
When a given formula is represented as F (x1, . . . , xn), we will typically write F
∗(x1, . . . , xn) instead of(
F (x1, . . . , xn)
)∗
.
Let X be a sequent. For an HPM, EPM or BMEPMM, we say thatM is a uniform solution for X iff
M |= X∗ for every interpretation ∗. And we say that X is uniformly valid iff there is a uniform solution
for X .
6 Some closure properties of computability
In this section we establish certain, mostly rather obvious yet important, closure properties for the com-
putability of static games. While these results can be stated and proven in more general forms than presented
here, for simplicity we restrict them to games expressible in the formal language of Section 5.
By a “rule” in this section we mean an (n + 1)-ary relation R on sequents, the instances of which are
schematically written as
X1 . . . Xn
X0
,
where X1, . . . , Xn are (metavariables for) sequents called the premises, and X0 is a sequent called the
conclusion. Whenever R(X1, . . . , Xn, X0) holds, we say that X0 follows from X1, . . . , Xn by R.
We say that such a ruleR is sound iff it preserves computability, in the sense that, whenever each premise
of a given instance of the rule is computable under a given interpretation, so is the conclusion (under the same
interpretation). And we say that R is uniform-constructively sound iff there is an effective procedure
that takes any instance (X1, . . . , Xn, X0) of the rule, any BMEPMs M1, . . . ,Mn and returns a BMEPM
M0 such that, for any interpretation
∗ and valuation e, whenever M1 |=e X
∗
1 , . . . ,Mn |=e X
∗
n, we have
M0 |=e X
∗
0 .
Below we prove several uniform-constructive soundness results. The proofs will be limited to showing how
to constructM0 from (X1, . . . , Xn, X0) andM1, . . . ,Mn. It will be immediately clear from our descriptions
of the M0s that they can be constructed effectively (so that the closure is “constructive”), and that their
work in no way depends on an interpretation ∗ applied to the sequents involved (so that the closure is
“uniform”). Since an interpretation ∗ is typically irrelevant in such proofs, we will often omit it and write
simply F or X where, strictly speaking, F ∗ or X∗ is meant. That is, we identify formulas or sequents with
the games into which they turn once an interpretation is applied to them. Similarly, a valuation e is often
irrelevant, and we write F or X where, strictly speaking, e[E∗] or e[X∗] is meant.
We agree that in this and subsequent sections, the expression
E1, . . . , En •–≀≀ F
is an abbreviation of
E1 ◦ E2 ◦ E3 ◦ . . . En−1 ◦ En •–≀≀ F
which, in turn, is an abbreviation of
E1 ◦ (E2 ◦ (E3 ◦ . . . (En−1 ◦ En) . . .)) •–≀≀ F.
When n = 0, the sequent E1, . . . , En •–≀≀ F is just •–≀≀ F . The expression “E1, . . . , En” will often be abbrevi-
ated as ~E.
Throughout this section, n is a natural number. Remember that we write T (E1, . . . , En) for an arbitrary
tree T of formulas with yield E1, . . . , En. Again, when n = 0, T (E1, . . . , En) is the empty tree. When
T (E1, . . . , En) = E1 ◦ . . . ◦ En or T is empty, we say that T is standard.
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6.1 Standardization and Destandardization
Standardization and Destandardization are the following two rules, respectively:
T (E1, . . . , En) •–≀≀ F
E1, . . . , En •–≀≀ F
E1, . . . , En •–≀≀ F
T (E1, . . . , En) •–≀≀ F
Standardization thus allows us to replace any tree of formulas in the antecedent of the premise by a
standard tree with the same yield, and Destandardization does the opposite.
Proposition 6.1 Both Standardization and Destandardization are uniform-constructively sound.
Proof. Here we only consider Standardization, with the case of Destandardization being fully symmetric.
AssumeM1 is a BMEPM that wins the premise under a given interpretation on a given valuation. Note
that the premise and the conclusion of the rule are “essentially the same”, with the minor difference that the
address of each leaf Ei in the premise may be different from the address of the corresponding leaf Ei in the
conclusion. Of course, one can easily figure out a bijection f that translates the addresses. We constructM0
by letting it be a machine that simulates M1, imagining that the valuation spelled on the valuation tape of
the latter is the same as the valuation spelled on its own valuation tape. In this simulation,M0 acts (grants
permissions, makes moves) in the same way asM1, only translates any move w.α or w: byM1 into f(w).α or
f(w): before mimicking it in the real play. Similarly, an environment’s move w.α in the real play it translates
into f−1(w).α before feeding it into the simulated play. Replicative moves, of course, change f (including its
domain), but correspondingly updating f each time is no problem. The only minor complication is related
to the fact that, when the environment makes a move u.α in the real play, or M1 makes move u.α in the
simulated play, u may not necessarily be the address of a leaf of the current antecedental tree, but rather a
prefix of some of such addresses. For instance, this is the case with the 7th move of Example 3.4. Let, in
this case, w1, . . . , wk be all the addresses of the leaves of the current antecedental tree such that u is a prefix
of them. Note that then, the effect of the single move u.α is the same as the effect of k consecutive moves
w1.α, . . . , wkα. So, M0 interprets the single move u.α as the block w1.α, . . . , wk.α before feeding it into the
simulated play or mimicking it in the real play. Remembering our assumption that M1 wins the premise, it
is not hard to see that M0 wins the conclusion. ✷
6.2 Exchange
Exchange is the following rule:
~E,H,G, ~K •–≀≀ F
~E,G,H, ~K •–≀≀ F
Proposition 6.2 Exchange is uniform-constructively sound.
Proof. The idea here is the same as in the proof of the previous proposition. M0 plays exactly asM1, only
correspondingly adjusting the addresses, and occasionally interpreting a single move as a block of moves. ✷
6.3 Weakening
Weakening is the following rule:
~E •–≀≀ F
~E, ~K •–≀≀ F
Proposition 6.3 Weakening is uniform-constructively sound.
Proof. Assume M1 is a BMEPM that wins the premise. We construct M0 by letting it be a machine
that plays exactly as M1 does, by simulating the latter. Only, M0 ignores any moves that the environment
makes within the ~K part of the antecedent, as if that part simply did not exist. In addition, if ~E is empty
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(while ~K is not), M0 adds the prefix “S.” when mimicking moves made by M1 in the succedent of the
premise, and deletes the same prefix when feeding back into the simulated play the environment’s moves in
the succedent of the conclusion. Obviously, M0 wins the game. ✷
6.4 Contraction
Contraction is the following rule:
~E,G,G •–≀≀ F
~E,G •–≀≀ F
Proposition 6.4 Contraction is uniform-constructively sound.
Proof. Again, assume M1 is a BMEPM that wins the premise. We construct M0 by letting it be a
machine that makes a replicative move which brings the conclusion down to the premise, and then continues
as M1. ✷
6.5 Instantiation
Instantiation is the following rule:
~E(x) •–≀≀ F (x)
~E(c) •–≀≀ F (c)
Here x is any variable, c is any constant, and the conclusion is the result of replacing, in the premise, all free
occurrences of x by c.
Proposition 6.5 Instantiation is uniform-constructively sound.
Proof. AssumeM1 is a BMEPM that wins the premise. We letM0 be the machine that, with a valuation
e spelled on its valuation tape, plays (by simulatingM1) asM1 would play with valuation e
′ on its valuation
tape, where e′ is the valuation that sends x to c and agrees with e on all other variables. ✷
6.6 Cut
Unlike all previous rules, Cut is a rule with two premises:
~E •–≀≀ F ~K,F •–≀≀ G
~E, ~K •–≀≀ G
Theorem 6.6 Cut is uniform-constructively sound.
Proof. A detailed technical proof of this theorem could be lengthy, and here we essentially only give
a proof idea (as we, in fact, did for all the previous propositions of this section as well). The terminology
we will be using below is even more relaxed than earlier. Specifically, it should be pointed out that to what
we may refer as “F” (or “ ~E”, etc.), strictly speaking, typically will not be the original F (or ~E, etc.), but
rather the game to which this component has evolved by the time of the context of such a reference.
Assume M1 and M2 are two BMEPMs that win ~E •–≀≀ F and ~K, F •–≀≀ G, respectively.
Let us first consider the simple case when the two machines never make any replicative moves in the
antecedents of the corresponding games. We let M0 be the following BMEPM. Its work on a valuation e
consists of infinitely many cycles. Each cycle consists in simulating, in parallel, the two machines M1 and
M2 with the same e on their valuation tapes. The simulation of either machine continues until it grants
permission. M0 records all moves made by the simulated machines. Once both machines have granted
permission, M0 halts simulation, and all moves made by the two machines in the ~E , ~K and G components
of the premises it mimics in the same components of the conclusion which is played in the real play (after
correspondingly readjusting the addresses of the leaves if necessary, and also perhaps interpreting certain
13
moves as whole blocks of moves, as we have already seen in the previous proofs). ThenM0 grants permission
in the real play, and records the environment’s response, which should be some (maybe none) moves within
the above components. NowM0 resumes simulation, feeding these moves back to the corresponding machines
as imaginary responses to their granting permission. In addition, it also feeds back to M1 all moves made
by M2 within the F component of the second premise, and vice versa: feeds back to M2 all moves made by
M1 within the F component of the first premise. Here the cycle ends, and the next cycle does the same,
starting (continuing) simulation of the two machines until they both grant permission, and so on. With
some thought and keeping in mind the crucial fact that the games we are talking about are static, one can
see that M0 wins ~E, ~K •–≀≀ G.
But, again, in the above simplified scenario we did not account for the possibility of replicative moves
that M1 and/or M2 may make. If a subcomponent of ~E is replicated (by M1) or a subcomponent of ~K
is replicated (by M2), M0 can replicate the same subcomponent in the conclusion, and otherwise continue
playing according to the earlier scenario. This case thus does not really create any complications. The case
of M2 replicating the F component, thus turning the game that it plays into ~K, F, F •–≀≀ G, is more serious
though. In this case, M0 needs to split its simulation of M1 into two simulations (continuations), let us
call them #1 and #2. It also correspondingly replicates the whole ~E part of the conclusion in the real play,
which — modulo Exchange and Standardization — will now look like ~E, ~E, ~K •–≀≀ G.6 From now on, the
moves made in the F component by M1 in simulation #1 (resp. #2) will be fed back into the first (resp.
second) copy of F in the game ~K, F, F •–≀≀ G played by the simulated M2, and vice versa: the moves made
by M2 within the first (resp. second) F component of that game will be fed back into simulation #1 (resp.
#2) of M1. Similarly, M0 will be mimicking the moves made by M1 in simulation #1 (resp. #2) within
the ~E component as moves in the first (resp. second) copy of ~E in ~E, ~E, ~K •–≀≀ G, and vice versa: feeding the
environment’s moves made in the first (resp. second) copy of ~E in ~E, ~E, ~K •–≀≀ G into simulation #1 (resp.
#2) of M1.
Subsequent replications by M2 of any given copy of F will be handled in a similar way, correspondingly
further increasing the number of various parallel simulations of M1 and the number of copies of ~E in the
antecedent of the conclusion. ✷
7 Logic CL12
The purpose of the deductive system CL12 that we construct in this section is to axiomatize the set of
uniformly valid sequents. In view of the closure under Standardization and Destandardization proven in
the previous section, limiting sequents to those with standard antecedents does not yield any real loss of
expressive power,7 and this is what we do from now on: the language of CL12 exclusively deals with such
sequents. Correspondingly, from now on, when we say “sequent”, we exclusively mean one of the form
E1, . . . , En •–≀≀ F
(n ≥ 0). For safety and also without loss of expressive power, we further agree that, from now on, the formulas
or sequents that we consider may not contain both bound and free occurrences of the same variable. Other
than these minor revisions, the language of CL12 is the same as the one introduced in Section 5.
Our formulation of CL12 relies on some terminology and notation explained below.
1. A surface occurrence of a subformula is an occurrence that is not in the scope of any choice operators.
2. A formula not containing choice operators — i.e., a formula of the classical language — is said to be
elementary.
6Remember what was said at the beginning of the proof about our relaxed terminology: of course, neither F nor ~E nor ~K
nor G will necessarily be exactly the same as the corresponding original subgames, but rather be whatever games they have
been brought down to by now.
7Some readers may be wondering why we did not then try to define dfb-reduction as an operation applied to sequences rather
than trees of games (in the antecedent) in the first place. There are reasons, discernable only to an expert on computability
logic. Among such reasons is that any attempt to replace trees with sequences would encounter the problem of violating the
(crucially important) static property of games. This is so because the effect of a move by ⊥ could depend on whether it was
made before or after a replicative move by ⊤, and it could thus change when one passes from a run to a ⊥-delay of it.
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3. A sequent is elementary iff all of its formulas are so.
4. The elementarization
‖F‖
of a formula F is the result of replacing in F all ⊔ - and ⊔-subformulas by ⊥, and all ⊓ - and ⊓-
subformulas by ⊤. Note that ‖F‖ is (indeed) an elementary formula.
5. The elementarization of a sequent G1, . . . , Gn •–≀≀ F is the elementary formula
‖G1‖ ∧ . . . ∧ ‖Gn‖→ ‖F‖.
6. A sequent is said to be stable iff its elementarization is classically valid. By “classical validity”, in view
of Go¨del’s completeness theorem, we mean provability in classical first-order calculus with constants,
function symbols and =, where = is treated as the logical identity predicate (so that, say, x = x,
x = y→ (E(x)→E(y)), etc. are provable).
7. We will be using the notation
F [E]
to mean a formula F together with some (single) fixed surface occurrence of a subformula E. Using this
notation sets a context, in which F [H ] will mean the result of replacing in F [E] the (fixed) occurrence
of E by H . Note that here we are talking about some occurrence of E. Only that occurrence gets
replaced when moving from F [E] to F [H ], even if the formula also had some other occurrences of E.
THE RULES OF CL12
CL12 has the six rules listed below, with the following additional conditions/explanations:
1. In ⊓ -Choose and ⊔ -Choose, i ∈ {0, 1}.
2. In ⊓-Choose and ⊔-Choose, t is either a constant or a variable with no bound occurrences in the
premise, and H(t) is the result of replacing by t all free occurrences of x in H(x) (rather than vice
versa).
⊔ -Choose
~G •–≀≀ F [Hi]
~G •–≀≀ F [H0 ⊔H1]
⊓ -Choose
~G, E[Hi], ~K •–≀≀ F
~G, E[H0 ⊓H1], ~K •–≀≀ F
⊓-Choose
~G, E[H(t)], ~K •–≀≀ F
~G, E[⊓xH(x)], ~K •–≀≀ F
⊔-Choose
~G •–≀≀ F [H(t)]
~G •–≀≀ F [⊔xH(x)]
Replicate
~G,E, ~K •–≀≀ F
~G,E, ~K,E •–≀≀ F
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Wait
X1, . . . , Xn
(n ≥ 0), where all of the following five conditions are satisfied:
Y
1. ⊓ -Condition: Whenever Y has the form ~G •–≀≀ F [H0 ⊓H1], both of the sequents ~G •–≀≀ F [H0] and
~G •–≀≀ F [H1] are among X1, . . . , Xn.
2. ⊔ -Condition: Whenever Y has the form ~G,E[H0 ⊔H1], ~K •–≀≀ F , both of the sequents ~G,E[H0], ~K •–≀≀ F
and ~G,E[H1], ~K •–≀≀ F are among X1, . . . , Xn.
3. ⊓-Condition: Whenever Y has the form ~G •–≀≀ F [⊓xH(x)], for some variable y not occurring in Y ,
the sequent ~G •–≀≀ F [H(y)] is among X1, . . . , Xn. Here and below, H(y) is the result of replacing by y
all free occurrences of x in H(x) (rather than vice versa).
4. ⊔-Condition: Whenever Y has the form ~G,E[⊔xH(x)], ~K •–≀≀ F , for some variable y not occurring in
Y , the sequent ~G,E[H(y)], ~K •–≀≀ F is among X1, . . . , Xn.
5. Stability Condition: Y is stable.
A CL12-proof of a sequent X is a sequence X1, . . . , Xn of sequents, with Xn = X , such that, each Xi
follows by one of the rules of CL12 from some (possibly empty in the case of Wait, and certainly empty in
the case of i = 1) set P of premises such that P ⊆ {X1, . . . , Xi−1}. When a CL12-proof of X exists, we say
that X is provable in CL12, and write CL12 ⊢ X .
Example 7.1 In this example, + is a binary function symbol. We write t1 + t2 instead of +(t1, t2). The
following sequence of sequents is a CL12-proof (of its last sequent):
1. ∀x(x+ 0 = x) •–≀≀ w + 0 = w Wait: (no premises)
2. ∀x(x+ 0 = x) •–≀≀ ⊔z(w + 0 = z) ⊔-Choose: 1
3. ∀x(x+ 0 = x) •–≀≀ ⊓y⊔z(y + 0 = z) Wait: 2
Example 7.2 The following is a CL12-proof:
1. ∀x∀y∀z
(
p(x, y) ∧ p(y, z)→ q(x, z)
)
, p(w, v), p(u,w) •–≀≀ q(u, v) Wait:
2. ∀x∀y∀z
(
p(x, y) ∧ p(y, z)→ q(x, z)
)
, p(w, v), p(u,w) •–≀≀ ⊔yq(u, y) ⊔-Choose: 1
3. ∀x∀y∀z
(
p(x, y) ∧ p(y, z)→ q(x, z)
)
, ⊔yp(w, y), p(u,w) •–≀≀ ⊔yq(u, y) Wait: 2
4. ∀x∀y∀z
(
p(x, y) ∧ p(y, z)→ q(x, z)
)
, ⊓x⊔yp(x, y), p(u,w) •–≀≀ ⊔yq(u, y) ⊓-Choose: 3
5. ∀x∀y∀z
(
p(x, y) ∧ p(y, z)→ q(x, z)
)
, ⊓x⊔yp(x, y), ⊔yp(u, y) •–≀≀ ⊔yq(u, y) Wait: 4
6. ∀x∀y∀z
(
p(x, y) ∧ p(y, z)→ q(x, z)
)
, ⊓x⊔yp(x, y), ⊓x⊔yp(x, y) •–≀≀ ⊔yq(u, y) ⊓-Choose: 5
7. ∀x∀y∀z
(
p(x, y) ∧ p(y, z)→ q(x, z)
)
, ⊓x⊔yp(x, y) •–≀≀ ⊔yq(u, y) Replicate: 6
8. ∀x∀y∀z
(
p(x, y) ∧ p(y, z)→ q(x, z)
)
, ⊓x⊔yp(x, y) •–≀≀ ⊓x⊔yq(x, y) Wait: 7
Example 7.3 In this CL12-proof, + is as in Example 7.1, and ′ is a unary function symbol. We write t′
instead of ′(t).
1. ∀x∀y
(
x+ y′ = (x + y)′
)
, s = v′, u+ w = v •–≀≀ u+ w′ = s Wait:
2. ∀x∀y
(
x+ y′ = (x + y)′
)
, s = v′, u+ w = v •–≀≀ ⊔z(u+ w′ = z) ⊔-Choose: 1
3. ∀x∀y
(
x+ y′ = (x + y)′
)
, ⊔y(y = v′), u+ w = v •–≀≀ ⊔z(u+ w′ = z) Wait: 2
4. ∀x∀y
(
x+ y′ = (x + y)′
)
, ⊓x⊔y(y = x′), u+ w = v •–≀≀ ⊔z(u+ w′ = z) ⊓-Choose: 3
5. ∀x∀y
(
x+ y′ = (x + y)′
)
, ⊓x⊔y(y = x′), ⊔z(u+ w = z) •–≀≀ ⊔z(u+ w′ = z) Wait: 4
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6. ∀x∀y
(
x+ y′ = (x + y)′
)
, ⊓x⊔y(y = x′), ⊓y⊔z(y + w = z) •–≀≀ ⊔z(u+ w′ = z) ⊓-Choose: 5
7. ∀x∀y
(
x+ y′ = (x + y)′
)
, ⊓x⊔y(y = x′), ⊓y⊔z(y + w = z) •–≀≀ ⊓y⊔z(y + w′ = z) Wait: 6
8 The soundness and completeness of CL12
Note that interpretations, as defined in this paper, are nothing but first-order models (structures) in the
classical sense with domain {0, 1, 2, . . .}. By Go¨del’s completeness theorem, an (elementary) formula F is
valid (in the classical sense) iff it is true in every such model. This, in view of the classical behavior of
¬, ∧ , ∨ , ∀, ∃ when applied to elementary formulas, means that, for an elementary formula, validity in the
classical sense means the same as uniform validity in our sense. We may implicitly rely on this fact in the
sequel.
The following lemma can be verified by straightforward induction on the complexity of F :
Lemma 8.1 For any formula F , interpretation ∗ and valuation e, WnF
∗
e 〈〉 =Wn
‖F‖∗
e 〈〉.
The above lemma easily extends from formulas to sequents:
Lemma 8.2 For any sequent X, interpretation ∗ and valuation e, WnX
∗
e 〈〉 =Wn
‖X‖∗
e 〈〉.
Below and elsewhere, by the length of a CL12-proof we mean the number of sequents appearing in the
proof.
Lemma 8.3 Let X and Y be arbitrary sequents such that one of the following four conditions is satisfied:
1. X has the form ~E •–≀≀ F [H0 ⊓H1], and Y is ~E •–≀≀ F [Hi] (i = 0 or i = 1).
2. X has the form ~E,G[H0 ⊔H1], ~K •–≀≀ F , and Y is ~E,G[Hi], ~K •–≀≀ F (i = 0 or i = 1).
3. X has the form ~E •–≀≀ F [⊓xH(x)], and Y is ~E •–≀≀ F [H(y)] for some variable y not occurring in X.
4. X has the form ~E,G[⊔xH(x)], ~K •–≀≀ F , and Y is ~E,G[H(y)], ~K •–≀≀ F for some variable y not occurring
in X.
Then, any CL12-proof P of X of length k can be effectively converted into a CL12-proof Q of Y of
length ≤ k. Furthermore, if X is derived by Wait in P, then the length of such a CL12-proof Q of Y will
be strictly less than k.
Proof. Consider arbitrary sequents X and Y , with X having a CL12-proof P of length k. Using
induction on k, the lemma can be proven by cases, depending on which of the four conditions of Lemma 8.3
is satisfied by X and Y .
Case 1: X and Y satisfy condition 1 of the lemma. Let us first consider the case when X is derived in
P by Wait. Note that then Y is among its premises, and hence has a proof of length less than k. That very
proof will be the sought proof Q of Y . Now suppose X is derived by any of the other rules from a premise
U . Note that U has the same form ~E′ •–≀≀ F ′[H0 ⊓H1] (some ~E′, F ′) as X has. Let W be ~E′ •–≀≀ F ′[Hi]. We
can apply the induction hypothesis to U andW (in the role of X and Y ) and find that W has a proof (which
can be effectively constructed) of length less than k. But note that Y follows from W by the same rule as
X follows from U . So, Y has a proof of length at most k.
Case 2: X and Y satisfy condition 2 of the lemma. This is similar to the previous case.
Case 3: X and Y satisfy condition 3 of the lemma. First we consider the case when X is derived in P
by Wait. Note that then a certain sequent Y ′, which is “essentially the same” as Y , is among the premises
of X , and hence has a proof of length less than k. Here Y ′ is “essentially the same” as Y in the sense that
it is either Y , or is different from Y only in that it has a variable z (z 6= y) where Y has y. Obviously this is
not a significant difference, and the proof of Y ′ can be turned into a proof of Y by just renaming variables.
Such a proof of Y will be the sought Q. Now it remains to consider the case of X being derived by any of
the other rules. Our reasoning in this case will be similar to the one given in Case 1.
Case 4: X and Y satisfy condition 4 of the lemma. Similar to the previous case. ✷
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Let us say that a sequent Y is a ⊥-development of a sequent X iff X and Y satisfy one of the four
conditions of Lemma 8.3. And we say that Y is a ⊤-development of X iff X follows from Y by one of the
rules of CL12 other than Wait.
Now, we say that Y is a transitive ⊥-development of X iff there are sequents Z1, . . . , Zn (n ≥ 2)
where Z1 = X , Zn = Y and, for each i with 1 ≤ i < n, Zi+1 is a ⊥-development of Zi. Transitive
⊤-development is defined similarly.
Lemma 8.4 Let X and Y be any sequents.
1. If Y is a transitive ⊥-development of X, X has a CL12-proof P of length k and the last sequent
of the proof (X) is derived by Wait, then Y has a CL12-proof Q of length less than k. Such a Q can be
effectively constructed from P.
2. If Y is a transitive ⊤-development of X and CL12 6⊢ X, then CL12 6⊢ Y .
Proof. Clause 1 is an immediate corollary of Lemma 8.3. And clause 2 is straightforward. ✷
Theorem 8.5 CL12 ⊢ X iff X is uniformly valid (any sequent X). Furthermore:
Uniform-constructive soundness There is an effective procedure that takes any CL12-proof of any
sequent X and constructs a uniform solution for X.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary sequent X .
Soundness: Assume X has a CL12-proof PX . Pick an arbitrary interpretation
∗. We want to (show
how to) construct a ∗-independent EPM MX that wins X
∗. As an induction hypothesis, we assume that,
for any CL12-proof PY of any sequent Y , as long as PY is shorter than PX , we know how to (effectively)
construct a ∗-independent EPMMY that wins Y
∗. In each case below, e is the (arbitrary) valuation spelled
on the valuation tape of the to-be-constructed machineMX . As was done before, we may omit either e or
∗
or both and, say, write simply X instead of e[X∗]. The work of MX depends on by what rule X is derived
in PX .
Case 1: X is derived from a premise Y by ⊔ -Choose. Then we let MX be the machine that makes a
move that brings X down to Y . For instance, if X is ~K •–≀≀ E ∧ (F ∨ (G ⊔H)) and Y is ~K •–≀≀ E ∧ (F ∨G),
then S.1.1.0 is such a move. After this, MX continues as MY with the same valuation e spelled on the
valuation tape of the latter. By the induction hypothesis, MY wins Y , which obviously implies that MX
wins X .
Case 2: X is derived from Y by ⊓ -Choose. Then, as in the previous case, MX is the machine that
makes a move that brings X down to Y . For instance, if X is E,F ⊓G,H •–≀≀ K (i.e., E ◦ ((F ⊓G)◦H) •–≀≀ K)
and Y is E,F,H •–≀≀ K (i.e., E ◦ (F ◦H) •–≀≀ K), then 10.0 is such a move. After this, MX continues as MY
with the same valuation e spelled on the valuation tape of the latter. By the induction hypothesis,MY wins
Y , which implies that MX wins X .
Case 3: X is derived from Y by ⊔-Choose. Then MX is the machine that makes a move that brings
e[X ] down to e[Y ]. For instance, if X is ~K •–≀≀ E ∧ (F ∨⊔xH(x)) and Y is ~K •–≀≀ E ∧ (F ∨H(t)), then S.1.1.c
is such a move, where c = t if t is a constant, and c = e(t) if t is a variable (in the latter case the machine
will have to read c from its valuation tape). After this move,MX continues asMY with the same valuation
e spelled on the valuation tape of the latter. By the induction hypothesis, MY wins Y , which implies that
MX wins X .
Case 4: X is derived from Y by ⊓-Choose. This case is similar to the previous one(s), and we can afford
to omit details.
Case 5: X is derived from Y by Replicate. Note that Replicate is nothing but a simple combination of
Contraction and Exchange. By the induction hypothesis, we have a machineMY winning the premise. Then,
in view of Propositions 6.2 and 6.4, we can construct the desired machine MX that wins the conclusion.
Case 6: X is derived by Wait. ThenMX keeps granting permission until the environment makes a move.
If such a move is never made, then the run that is generated is empty. As X is derived by Wait, it is stable,
so that ‖X‖ is classically valid. But then, in view of Lemma 8.2, the machine is the winner, no matter what
valuation e is spelled on its valuation tape. Suppose now the environment makes a move. We may assume
that such a move is legal, or else the machine immediately wins. With a little thought, one can see that
any legal move α by the environment brings the game down to e′[Y ] for a certain valuation e′ and a certain
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sequent Y such that Y is a transitive ⊥-development of X . For example, if X is ~K •–≀≀ ⊓xH(x) and α is
S.5, then Y can be chosen to be ~K •–≀≀ H(y) for a variable y not occurring in X , and then e′ would be the
valuation that sends y to 5 and agrees with e on all other variables, so that e′[ ~K •–≀≀ H(y)] is e[ ~K •–≀≀ H(5)],
with the latter being the game to which e[X ] is brought down by the labmove ⊥S.5. As another example,
consider X = ⊔xE(x)◦⊔xE(x) •–≀≀ F and α = .5 (so that the effect of α is making the move 5 in both leaves
of the antecedent). Then Y can be chosen to be E(y) ◦E(z) •–≀≀ F for some fresh variables y and z, in which
case e′ would be the valuation that sends both y and z to 5, and agrees with e on all other variables. Both
Y and e′ can be effectively found. Furthermore, by clause 1 of Lemma 8.4, Y has a shorter proof Q than X
does, and Q, too, can be effectively found. Then, by the induction hypothesis, an EPMMY with MY |= Y
can be further constructed effectively. So, our MX now constructs MY and plays the rest of the game as
MY would play with the valuation e
′ spelled on its valuation tape. This obviously makes MX successful.
Completeness: Assume CL12 6⊢ X . Here we describe a counterstrategy for X in the form of an EPM C
with an oracle for CL12-provability. “Counterstrategy” means that C plays as EPMs generally do, with the
difference that it plays in the role of ⊥ rather than ⊤. That is, the moves it makes get the label ⊥, and
the moves by its adversary get the label ⊤. It will be seen that C is always the winner for an appropriately
selected valuation g and interpretation ∗. In view of Lemma 20.8 of [1], this implies that X has no uniform
solution.
For a sequent Y and valuation e, we say that e is Y -distinctive iff e assigns different values to different
free variables of Y , and all those values are also different from any constants occurring in Y . We fix g
as an arbitrary X-distinctive valuation, which is going to be the above-mentioned “appropriately selected
valuation”.
The work of C, in a sense, is symmetric to the work of the machine MX constructed in the proof of
the soundness part. We define it recursively. At any time, it deals with a pair (Y, e), where Y is a CL12-
unprovable sequent and e is a Y -distinctive valuation. The initial value of Y is X , and the initial value of e
is the above X-distinctive valuation g, which we assume is the valuation spelled on the valuation tape of C.
How C acts on (Y, e) depends on Y .
If Y is stable, then there should be a CL12-unprovable sequent Z satisfying one of the following condi-
tions, for otherwise Y would be derivable by Wait. Using its oracle for CL12-provability, C finds and selects
one such Z (say, lexicographically the smallest one), and acts according to the corresponding prescription as
given below.
Case 1: Y has the form ~E •–≀≀ F [G0 ⊓G1], and Z is ~E •–≀≀ F [Gi] (i = 0 or i = 1). In this case, C makes a
move that brings Y down to Z, and calls itself on (Z, e).
Case 2: Y has the form ~E, F [G0 ⊓G1], ~K •–≀≀ H , and Z is ~E, F [Gi], ~K •–≀≀ H . This case is similar to the
previous one.
Case 3: Y has the form ~E •–≀≀ F [⊓xG(x)], and Z is ~E •–≀≀ F [G(y)], where y is a variable not occurring in
Y . In this case, C makes a move that brings Y down to ~E •–≀≀ F [G(c)] for some (say, the smallest) constant c
such that c is different from any constant occurring in Y , as well as from any e(z) where z is a free variable
of Y . After this move, C calls itself on (Z, e′), where e′ is the valuation that sends y to c and agrees with e
on all other variables.
Case 4: Y has the form ~E, F [⊓xG(x)], ~K •–≀≀ H , and Z is ~E, F [G(y)], ~K •–≀≀ H , where y is a variable not
occurring in Y . This case is similar to the previous one.
Next, we consider the cases when Y is not stable. Then C keeps granting permission until the environment
makes a move.
Case 5: If such a move is never made, then the run that is generated is empty. As Y is not stable, ‖Y ‖
is not classically valid. Also, as promised earlier and as it is easy to verify, e is a Y -distinctive valuation and
hence, of course, it is also ‖Y ‖-distinctive. It is a common knowledge from classical logic that, whenever
a formula F is invalid and e is an F -distinctive valuation, e[F ] is false in some model. So, e[‖Y ‖] is false
in/under some model/interpretation ∗. This, in view of Lemma 8.2, implies that WnY
∗
e 〈〉 = ⊥ and hence C
is the winner in the overall play of X∗ on g.
Case 6: Now assume the adversary makes a move. We may assume that such a move is legal, or else
C immediately wins. With a little thought, one can see that any legal move α by the adversary will bring
the game down to e′[Z∗] for a certain Z-distinctive valuation e′ and sequent Z such that Z is a transitive
⊤-development of Y . By clause 2 of Lemma 8.4, CL12 6⊢ Z. So, our machine just calls itself on (Z, e′).
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It is clear that C wins as long as Case 6 occurs only finitely many times. And, if not, C again wins, as
then the run is infinite. ✷
9 Natural deduction
We are going to construct a CL-based arithmetic in the form of a natural deduction system. This sec-
tion explains the basic concepts and notational conventions for such systems in general, using the (slightly
improved) Fitch style.
Each natural deduction system will have a collection of rules (of inference), and a deduction in such a
system will look something like the following:
Steps Justifications
E1
E2
E3
E4
E5
E6
E7
E8
E9
E10
E11
E12
E13
1.
2.
3.
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.1.
4.3.2.
4.3.3.
4.4.
5.
6.1.
6.2.
7.
Hypothesis
Hypothesis
Rule3: ~n3
Hypothesis
Rule5: ~n5
Hypothesis
Rule7: ~n7
Rule8: ~n8
Rule9: ~n9
Rule10: ~n10
Hypothesis
Rule12: ~n12
Rule13: ~n13
Each Ei here should be a formula (rather than sequent) of the language of CL12, or whatever fragment
of that language is considered in a given system. The above is a deduction of E13 from the hypotheses
E1 and E2. The steps 1 through 7 are those of the main (parent) deduction. This deduction has
two subdeductions (children). The first subdeduction comprises steps 4.1 through 4.4 (which can be
compressed and, together, called step 4 of the main deduction), and the second subdeduction comprises
steps 6.1 and 6.2 (or, step 6 of the main deduction). One of the steps of the first subdeduction, in turn, is
itself a subdeduction, consisting of three steps. The vertical lines delimit (sub)deductions, and the horizontal
line in each (sub)deduction separates the Hypotheses from the rest of the steps. Each subdeduction thus
may have its own hypotheses, in addition to those of its parents, grandparents, etc. On the other hand, the
hypotheses of children do not count as those of parents, so that the deduction of E13 that we see above is a
deduction from (only) the hypotheses E1 and E2.
Each formula in a deduction should come with a justification. The justification for each hypothesis is
the same: an indication that the step is a hypothesis (which, in fact, is redundant as the hypotheses can be
recognized as the steps above the horizontal bar). And the justification for any other formula Ei should be
an indication of the rule Rulei by which the formula is obtained, and the step numbers ~ni for the premises
of the corresponding application of the rule. Here a rule is a relation of the type
({Formulas} ∪ {Subdeductions})n → {Formulas}
(n may not necessarily be fixed, as in the LC rule of the following section). Such a rule has n premises, and
a justification should list each of those premises (identified by step numbers) together with the rule name.
An important restriction is on what steps can serve as premises for a given application of a rule. First of
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all, each premise should be a step that occurs earlier than the given step. But not all earlier steps can be
used. Specifically, the steps appearing inside earlier subdeductions that are no longer active (are “closed”)
cannot be referred to. Only the entire child subdeduction (rather than particular steps within it) can serve
as a premise for a step in the parent deduction. For example, in the deduction of the above figure, the steps
that ~n12 may include are limited to 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.1. Note that here we have written 4 as a reference to
the entire child subdeduction 4.1-4.4. ~n12 cannot include any of the particular substeps 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 or 4.4
of 4, or any of the substeps 4.3.1, 4.3.2 or 4.3.3 of substep 4.3. That is because all these steps are within
already closed subdeductions. Similarly, the steps that ~n13 can include are limited to 1, 2, 3, 4 (as a whole
subdeduction), 5 and 6 (as a whole subdeduction). And the steps that ~n9 can include are limited to 1, 2, 3,
4.1, 4.2 and 4.3; it cannot include 4.3.1, 4.3.2 or 4.3.3.
10 Computability-logic-based arithmetic
There can be various reasonable systems of arithmetic based on computability logic, depending on what
language we consider, what fragment of CL is taken as a logical basis, and what extra-logical rules and
axioms are employed. The system CLA1 offered in this section is one of them. Its language, whose formulas
we call CLA1-formulas and whose sequents we call CLA1-sequents, is obtained from the language of
CL12 by removing all nonlogical predicate symbols (thus only leaving the logical predicate symbol =), all
constants but 0, and all but three function symbols, which are:
• successor, unary. We will write t′ for successor(t).
• sum, binary. We will write t1 + t2 for sum(t1, t2).
• product, binary. We will write t1 × t2 for product(t1, t2).
We shall also typically write x 6= y for ¬x = y.
The concept of an interpretation defined earlier can now be restricted to interpretations that are only
defined on =, ′, + and ×, as the language has no other predicate or function symbols. Of such interpretations,
the standard interpretation † is the one that interprets = as the identity relation, ′ as the successor (x+1)
function, + as the sum function, and × as the product function. Where F is a CLA1-formula, the standard
interpretation of F is the game F †, which we typically write simply as F . Similarly for CLA1-sequents.
The axioms of CLA1 are the ∀-closures of the following:
1. 0 6= x′
2. x′ = y′→ x = y
3. x+ 0 = x
4. x+ y′ = (x+ y)′
5. x× 0 = 0
6. x× y′ = (x× y) + x
7. ⊓x⊔y(y = x′)
8. F (0) ∧ ∀x(F (x)→ F (x′))→ ∀xF (x), where F (x) is any elementary formula
CLA1 is a natural deduction system, and the above axioms are treated as rules of inference (in the sense
of the previous section) that take no premises. In addition, CLA1 has the following two rules:
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Logical Consequence (LC)
G1
.
.
.
Gn
.
.
.
Ft
where CL12 ⊢ G1, . . . , Gn •–≀≀ F
Constructive Induction (CI)
F (0)
.
.
.
F (x)
.
.
.
F (x′)
.
.
.
⊓xF (x)t
where x is a fresh variable
Here • indicates the conclusion of the rule, and whatever steps we see before the conclusion are the
premises. Rule LC thus takes any n (n ≥ 0) premisesG1, . . . , Gn and, provided thatCL12 ⊢ G1, . . . , Gn •–≀≀ F ,
yields the conclusion F . The CI rule takes two premises: a formula of the form F (0) and a subdeduction
that has F (x) as a single premise and F (x′) as the last step. The “freshness” requirement on x means that
x should not occur anywhere earlier in the proof. This condition can be safely weakened by only requiring
that x does not occur in any earlier steps other than perhaps those within already closed subdeductions.
Deductions in this system we call CLA1-deductions.
A CLA1-proof of a formula F is a CLA1-deduction of F from the empty set of hypotheses.
CLA1, however, can be used not only for proving formulas, but sequents as well. A CLA1-proof of a
sequent E1, . . . , En •–≀≀ F is a CLA1-deduction of F from hypotheses E1, . . . , En.
An extended CLA1-proof of a sequent or formula X is a CLA1-proof of X where to each application
of the LC rule is attached, as an additional justification, a CL12-proof of corresponding sequent, i.e. of the
sequent whose antecedent consists of the premises of the rule and whose succedent is the conclusion of the
rule.
When a CLA1-proof of a sequent or formula X exists, we say that X is provable in CLA1 and write
CLA1 ⊢ X .
Note that CLA1-provability of a formula F can be seen as a special case of the more general concept
of provability of sequents. Specifically, it can be understood as CLA1-provability of the empty-antecedent
sequent •–≀≀ F .
CLA1 is a computability-logic-based counterpart of the classical-logic-based Peano arithmetic PA,
the best known and most studied applied formal theory of all. Formulas of PA are nothing but elementary
(choice-operator-free) formulas of the language of CLA1. And the axioms of PA are the same as those
of CLA1, only without the nonelementary Axiom 7. The latter says simply that the successor function is
computable. And the CI rule, while formally being nothing but an ordinary induction principle with just
∀ replaced by ⊓, in fact, provides for primitive recursion. A point worth emphasizing here is that, by just
adding to PA the very innocuous-looking Axiom 7 and rule CI, we (CLA1, that is) get, via computability
logic, substantial information about computability. The information obtained in this way may not be new,
but the fact that it is obtained by purely logical methods is a strong indication that computability logic can
really do what it is intended to do.
For typesetting considerations and without any danger of ambiguity, in the following examples we con-
struct CLA1-deductions without using vertical or horizontal bars.
Example 10.1 Proving ⊓x⊓y⊔z(y + x = z) in CLA1:
1. ∀x(x + 0 = x) Axiom 3
2. ∀x∀y
(
x+ y′ = (x+ y)′
)
Axiom 4
3. ⊓x⊔y(y = x′) Axiom 7
4. ⊓y⊔z(y + 0 = z) LC: 1 (Example 7.1)
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5.1. ⊓y⊔z(y + w = z) Hypothesis
5.2. ⊓y⊔z(y + w′ = z) LC: 2, 3, 5.1 (Example 7.3)
6. ⊓x⊓y⊔z(y + x = z) CI: 4, 5
Note that the classical counterpart ∀x∀y∃z(y+x = z) of the above-proven formula is not very interesting
— being logically valid, it carries no information whatsoever, and is true not only for + but for any other
function as well. As for ⊓x⊓y⊔z(y + x = z), it is not trivial at all. In view of the forthcoming soundness
theorem for CLA1, its provability signifies that for any x and y, a z with y+x = z not merely exists, but can
also be algorithmically found; furthermore, such an algorithm, itself, can be constructed from a proof of the
formula. So, Example 10.1 demonstrates the nontrivial (albeit not novel) fact that addition is a computable
function; and the proof given there actually encodes an algorithm for computing this function. Similarly,
the following example implies the computability of multiplication:
Example 10.2 Proving ⊓x⊓y⊔z(y × x = z) in CLA1:
1. ∀x(x × 0 = 0) Axiom 5
2. ∀x∀y
(
x× y′ = (x× y) + x
)
Axiom 6
3. ⊓x⊓y⊔z(y + x = z) (Example 10.1)
4. ⊓y⊔z(y × 0 = z) LC: 1 (similar to Example 7.1)
5.1. ⊓y⊔z(y × w = z) Hypothesis
5.2. ⊓y⊔z(y × w′ = z) LC: 2, 3, 5.1 (similar to Example 7.3)
6. ⊓x⊓y⊔z(y × x = z) CI: 4, 5
In view of the well known deduction theorem, one of the many equivalent ways to define the provability
of a formula F in PA is to say that F is provable in PA iff there are axioms E1, . . . , En such that the formula
E1 ∧ . . . ∧En→ F is provable in classical predicate calculus. Suppose the latter is indeed the case. Note
that then the sequent E1, . . . , En •–≀≀ F is provable in CL12— namely, derivable by Wait from the empty set
of premises. Each Ei, being an axiom of (PA and hence also of) CLA1, is also provable in CLA1. Then,
by LC, F is also provable. To summarize:
Fact 10.3 Every formula provable in PA is also provable in CLA1.
Thus, CLA1 is an extension of PA. A natural question to which at present we have no answer is whether
CLA1 is a conservative extension of PA, that is, whether every elementary formula F provable in CLA1
is also provable in PA.
While, by Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, PA fails to prove all true arithmetic formulas, PA is still
“practically complete”, in the sense that it proves all reasonably simple (usually called “elementary”, but
not in our present sense of this word) true facts about natural numbers. Most readers are well familiar with
PA and have a good feel of what it can prove. This allows us to relax our proofs and, in presenting them,
justify some “steps” (which, in reality, are sequences of many steps rather than single steps) by saying that
the formula in the step is provable in PA.
Example 10.4 The following sequence is a CLA1-proof of its last formula (by the way, what does that
formula say?). Even(x) should be understood as an abbreviation of ∃z(x = z+z), and Odd as an abbreviation
of ∀z(x 6= z + z).
1. Even(0) PA
2. Even(0) ⊔Odd(0) LC: 1
3.1. Even(x) ⊔Odd(x) Hypothesis
3.2. Even(x)→Odd(x′) PA
3.3. Odd(x)→Even(x′) PA
3.4. Even(x′) ⊔Odd(x′) LC: 3.1, 3,2, 3.3
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4. ⊓x(Even(x) ⊔Odd(x)) CI: 2, 3
5. ∀x∀y
((
Even(x) ∧Even(y)
)
∨
(
Odd(x) ∧Odd(y)
)
→ Even(x+ y)
)
PA
6. ∀x∀y
((
Even(x) ∧Odd(y)
)
∨
(
Odd(x) ∧Even(y)
)
→Odd(x+ y)
)
PA
7. ∀y
(
Even(y) ⊔Odd(y)→⊓x(Even(x+ y) ⊔Odd(x+ y)
)
LC: 4, 5, 6
We could, of course, directly find an algorithmic solution for the problem expressed by formula 7 of the
above example. But had our ad hoc methods failed to succeed — which would likely be the case if the
problem was more complex than it is — an algorithmic solution for it or any other CLA1-provable problem
could be effectively found from a CLA1-proof of it, as implied by the following, already mentioned theorem,
establishing the status of CLA1 as a systematic problem-solving tool:
Theorem 10.5 For any formula or sequent X, if CLA1 ⊢ X, then X (under the standard interpretation)
is computable.
Furthermore, there is an effective procedure that takes an arbitrary extended CLA1-proof of an arbitrary
formula or sequent X and constructs a BMEPM (or EPM, or HPM if you like) M with M |= X.
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction on the lengths of deductions. As provability of formulas is
a special (or easier) case of provability of sequents, considering only sequents here would be sufficient.
Let X = ~E •–≀≀ F , and consider any CLA1-deduction of F from hypotheses ~E.
If F is an axiom, obviously it is computable. Specifically, all axioms except Axiom 7 are true elementary
formulas, and they are “computed” by a machine that makes no moves at all. And Axiom 7 is computed by
a machine that waits for the adversary to make a move n, then increments n by one and makes (the decimal
string representing) the resulting number as its only move in the game. According to our conventions,
semantically F is the same as •–≀≀ F . So, we know how to compute •–≀≀ F . Then, by Proposition 6.3, we also
know how to compute ~E •–≀≀ F .
Next, suppose F is obtained from premises G1, . . . , Gk by LC. Observe that, for each Gi, we have a
shorter (shorter than that of F from ~E) deduction of Gi from ~E and, of course, such a deduction can be
effectively obtained from the deduction of F . Thus, by the induction hypothesis, we know how to compute
~E •–≀≀ Gi. Since F is derived by LC, we have CL12 ⊢ G1, . . . , Gk •–≀≀ F and hence, by Theorem 8.5, we also
know how to compute G1, . . . , Gk •–≀≀ F .8 Applying Theorem 6.6 k times (in combination with Propositions
6.2 and 6.4), we then also know how to compute ~E •–≀≀ F .
Finally, suppose F is obtained from premises G(0) and a subdeduction of G(x′) from the hypothesis G(x)
by CI, so that F is ⊓xG(x). As in the previous case, by the induction hypothesis, we know how to compute
~E •–≀≀ G(0). Further, note that G(x′) has a shorter (than that of F from ~E) deduction from the hypotheses
~E,G(x). So, by the induction hypothesis, we also know how to compute ~E,G(x) •–≀≀ G(x′) and hence (by
Proposition 6.5) ~E,G(0) •–≀≀ G(0′). The latter, as a game, is the same as ~E,G(0) •–≀≀ G(1). Then, by Theorem
6.6 (in combination with Propositions 6.2 and 6.4), we know how to compute ~E •–≀≀ G(1). Denote by M1
the machine that computes ~E •–≀≀ G(1). Continuing in the same way, we can construct machines M2, M3,
. . . that compute ~E •–≀≀ G(2), ~E •–≀≀ G(3), . . . . Thus, for any n, we can effectively construct a machine Mn
with Mn |= ~E •–≀≀ G(n). Now, the goal problem ~E •–≀≀ ⊓xG(x) is computed by a machine that waits till the
environment brings the game down to ~E •–≀≀ G(n) for some particular n, after which it constructs Mn and,
by simulating it (or “turning itself into Mn”), plays the rest of the game as Mn would. ✷
Exercise 10.6 Show that CLA1 ⊢ ⊓x⊓y(x = y ⊔ x 6= y).
We want to close this section by observing one fact.9 In view of Axiom 7, Example 10.1, Example 10.2
and Exercise 10.6, any interpretation for which the axioms and rules of CLA1 are sound (and which is
8This is the only place where we rely on the condition that the proof under consideration is an extended one. One can get
by without “extended” is one is willing to let the algorithm search for the needed CL12-proofs. Such an algorithm, however,
would be dramatically more complex than the present one.
9Pointed out by the referee.
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therefore a model of PA) must interpret ′, + and × as recursive functions and = as a recursive relation. So,
(one of the versions of) Tennenbaum’s well-known theorem applies and says that the interpretation must
be elementarily equivalent to the standard model. Thus, computability logic goes well beyond traditional
first-order logic, not only by its computation-based semantics but also by being able to characterize the
standard model of arithmetic.
11 Some variations of CLA1
Among the main purposes of the present article was just to introduce CL-based applied theories, in the par-
ticular form of the CL-based arithmetic CLA1. There is a tremendous amount of interesting and promising
work in the direction of exploring such theories and their metatheories, left as a challenge for the future. In
this line of research, some other versions of CL-based arithmetic might as well be at least equally interesting.
One such version is the extension of CLA1 that we call CLA2. The language of the latter is no longer
limited to 0,=,′ ,+,×, but rather is the full language of CL12, having all constants and an infinite supply of
fresh predicate and function symbols for each arity, with the above symbols having a special status. Other
than that, the axioms and rules of CLA2 are virtually the same as those of CLA1 (only, Axiom 8 and
the two rules no longer limited to CLA1-formulas). By a standard interpretation we now mean any
interpretation that agrees with the standard interpretation † of Section 10 on =,′ ,+,×. And let us say that
a formula or sequent X of the language of CLA2 is CLA2-valid iff there is a BMEPM M such that, for
any standard interpretation ∗, M |= X∗.
Going back to our proof of the soundness of CLA1, one can see that the proof of Theorem 10.5 never
really relied on the fact that the language of CLA1 was limited to =,′ ,+,×. So, that theorem can be
without any additional efforts strengthened to the following one:
Theorem 11.1 For any formula or sequent X, if CLA2 ⊢ X, then X is CLA2-valid.
Furthermore, there is an effective procedure that takes an arbitrary extended CLA2-proof of an arbitrary
formula or sequent X and constructs a BMEPM (or EPM, or HPM if you like) M such that, for every
standard interpretation ∗, M |= X∗.
Among the reasons for wanting to consider CLA2 instead of CLA1 can be the greater flexibility and
convenience that it offers. Mathematicians usually do not confine themselves to strictly fixed collections of
symbols such as =,′ ,+,×, and feel free to introduce new function or predicate symbols in their activities.
CLA2 allows us to directly account for that kind of practice. Specifically, one can introduce a number of
predicate and/or function symbols through definitions E1, . . . , En, and then prove a formula F containing
such symbols through proving the sequent E1, . . . , En •–≀≀ F in CLA2.
As an example, below we show how all primitive-recursive functions can be proven computable in CLA2,
with CLA2 thus providing a tool for actually computing any such function. Obviously the same can be
done within CLA1 as well, as primitive-recursive functions can eventually be expressed only using =,′ ,+
and ×. But this would be a very indirect way, with the resulting proofs leading to terrible algorithms. In
contrast, CLA2 produces natural proofs, yilding algorithms for computing primitive-recursive functions by
directly using their primitive-recursive constructions.
We first reproduce some definitions from [15]. Let f be a function symbol of the indicated (by the number
of explicitly shown arguments) arity.
An absolute primitive-recursive definition of f is a formula of one of the following forms:
(I) ∀x
(
f(x) = x′
)
.
(II) ∀x1 . . . ∀xn
(
f(x1, . . . , xn) = 0
)
.
(III) ∀x1 . . . ∀xn
(
f(x1, . . . , xn) = xi
)
(some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}).
And a relative primitive-recursive definition of f is a formula of one of the following forms:
(IV) ∀x1 . . . ∀xn
(
f(x1, . . . , xn) = g
(
h1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , hm(x1, . . . , xn)
))
.
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(V)
∀x2 . . .∀xn
(
f(0, x2, . . . , xn) = g(x2, . . . , xn)
)
∧
∀x1∀x2 . . . ∀xn
(
f(x′1, x2, . . . , xn) = h
(
x1, f(x1, x2, . . . , xn), x2, . . . , xn
))
.
We say that (IV) defines f in terms of g, h1, . . . , hm. Similarly, we say that (V) defines f in terms of g
and h.
A primitive-recursive construction of f is a sequence E1, . . . , Ek of formulas, where each Ei is a
primitive-recursive definition of some gi, all such gi are distinct, gk = f and, for each i, Ei is either an
absolute primitive-recursive definition of gi, or a relative primitive-recursive definition of gi in terms of some
gjs with j < i.
Proposition 11.2 Let f be an n-ary function symbol, and ~E = E1, . . . , Ek a primitive-recursive construc-
tion of f . Then CLA2 ⊢ ~E •–≀≀ ⊓x1 . . .⊓xn⊔y
(
f(x1, . . . , xn) = y
)
.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the proposition. We prove it by induction on k, considering five
possibilities for Ek. As hypotheses of the following deductions, we only include those Ei (i < k) that are
explicitly used. The other Ej , of course, can be vacuously added to the list of hypotheses.
Case (I): Ek has the form (I). Below is a CLA2-proof of the desired sequent:
1. ∀x
(
f(x) = x′
)
Hypothesis
2. ⊓x⊔y(y = x′) Axiom 7
3. ⊓x⊔y
(
f(x) = y
)
LC: 1, 2
Case (II): Ek has the form (II). Below is a CLA2-proof of the desired sequent.
1. ∀x1 . . . ∀xn
(
f(x1, . . . , xn) = 0
)
Hypothesis
2. ⊓x1 . . .⊓xn⊔y
(
f(x1, . . . , xn) = y
)
LC: 1
Case (III): Ek has the form (III). Below is a CLA2-proof of the desired sequent.
1. ∀x1 . . . ∀xn
(
f(x1, . . . , xn) = xi
)
Hypothesis
2. ⊓x1 . . .⊓xn⊔y
(
f(x1, . . . , xn) = y
)
LC: 1
Case (IV): Ek has the form (IV). Below is a (lazy) CLA2-proof of the desired sequent.
1. ∀x1 . . . ∀xn
(
f(x1, . . . , xn) = g
(
h1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , hm(x1, . . . , xn)
))
Hypothesis
2. ⊓x1 . . .⊓xm⊔y
(
g(x1, . . . , xm) = y
)
Provable by the induction hypothesis
3. ⊓x1 . . .⊓xn⊔y
(
h1(x1, . . . , xn) = y
)
Provable by the induction hypothesis
· · ·
m+2. ⊓x1 . . .⊓xn⊔y
(
hm(x1, . . . , xn) = y
)
Provable by the induction hypothesis
m+3. ⊓x1 . . .⊓xn⊔y
(
f(x1, . . . , xn) = y
)
LC: 1, . . . , m+2
Case (V): Ek has the form (V). Below is a (lazy) CLA2-proof of the desired sequent.
1.
∀x2 . . .∀xn
(
f(0, x2, . . . , xn) = g(x2, . . . , xn)
)
∧
∀x1∀x2 . . . ∀xn
(
f(x′1, x2, . . . , xn) = h
(
x1, f(x1, x2, . . . , xn), x2, . . . , xn
)) Hypothesis
2. ⊓x2 . . .⊓xn⊔y
(
g(x2, . . . , xn) = y
)
Provable by the induction hypothesis
3. ⊓x1⊓z⊓x2 . . .⊓xn⊔y
(
h(x1, z, x2, . . . , xn) = y
)
Provable by the induction hypothesis
4. ⊓x2 . . .⊓xn⊔y
(
f(0, x2, . . . , xn) = y
)
LC: 1, 2
5.1. ⊓x2 . . .⊓xn⊔y
(
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = y
)
Hypothesis
5.2. ⊓x2 . . .⊓xn⊔y
(
f(x′1, x2, . . . , xn) = y
)
LC: 1, 3, 5.1
6. ⊓x1⊓x2 . . .⊓xn⊔y
(
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = y
)
CI: 4, 5
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✷The other CL-based system of arithmetic that we want to introduce before closing this section is CLA3.
While CLA2 is more expressive than CLA1, CLA3 is a modification of CLA1 in the opposite direction:
the language of CLA3 is obtained from the language of CLA1 by forbidding the blind quantifiers ∀ and
∃. The rules of inference of CLA3 are the same LC and CI as in CLA1, only now restricted to ∀, ∃-free
formulas. And the axioms are the following:
1. ⊓x(0 6= x′)
2. ⊓x⊓y(x′ = y′→ x = y)
3. ⊓x(x + 0 = x)
4. ⊓x⊓y
(
x+ y′ = (x+ y)′
)
5. ⊓x(x × 0 = 0)
6. ⊓x⊓y
(
x× y′ = (x× y) + x
)
7. ⊓x⊔y(y = x′)
In view of the obvious fact that CL12 always proves ∀xE(x) •–≀≀ ⊓xE(x), all of the axioms of CLA3,
which differ from the corresponding axioms of CLA1 only in that they are ⊓- rather than ∀-prefixed, are
provable in CLA1. This, in turn, implies that CLA3, just like CLA2, inherits the soundness of CLA1 in
the strong form of Theorem 10.5.
From the philosophical point of view, the potential interest in CLA3 is related to the fact that it is
a perfectly constructive system of arithmetic and, unlike some other systems with constructivistic claims
such as Heyting’s intuitionistic-calculus-based arithmetic, has a clear and convincing constructive semantics.
What makes CLA3 “perfectly constructive” is that it gets rid of the only potentially “dubious” operators
∀ and ∃, with all the remaining operators being fully immune to any doubts or criticism from even the most
radical constructivistic point of view. A relevant observation to be made here is that forbidding ∀, ∃ in the
formulas of CLA3 automatically propagates to the underlying logic CL12 as well: it is not hard to see that,
when the premises and conclusion of LC are ∀, ∃-free, then so are all intermediate steps performed within
CL12 when justifying an application of LC. That means that, in fact, the underlying logic of CLA3 is the
∀, ∃-free fragment of CL12 rather than the full CL12.
On the mathematical side, an important feature of CLA3 is that its concept of “truth” (=computability),
unlike that of CLA1 or just PA, can be expressed in the language of PA. Specifically, one could show
that the arithmetical complexity of the predicate of “truth” for CLA3-formulas is Σ3. Replacing the
classical quantifiers in such a predicate by their choice counterparts ⊓ and ⊔ yields a formula which, in a
sense, expresses the “truth” predicate of CLA3 in the language of CLA3 itself. This unusual phenomenon
may yield unusual effects in the metatheory of CLA3, which can make CLA3 an interesting subject for
metainvestigations.
12 The closure of static games under dfb-reduction
This section should be treated as an appendix, which many readers may (safely) decide to skip. In it we prove
a technical but important fact, according to which •–≀≀ preserves the static property of games. Not passing
the test for preserving the static property would disqualify any game operation from being considered within
the current framework of CL, as only static games are “well behaved”, and many steps in our earlier proofs
(specifically, the proofs of the closure properties of Section 6, the proof of the soundness and completeness
of CL12, or the proofs of the soundness of CLA1, CLA2, CLA3) would fail if the underlying games were
not static.
Let us remember the key relevant definitions first. We say that a run ∆ is a ⊤-delay of a run Γ iff the
following two conditions are satisfied:
• For either player ℘ ∈ {⊤,⊥}, erasing all ℘-labeled moves in Γ results in the same run as erasing all
℘-labeled moves in ∆.
27
• For all k and n, if the kth ⊤-labeled move is made later than (is to the right of) the nth ⊥-labeled
move in Γ, then so is it in ∆.
⊥-delay is defined similarly, with ⊤ and ⊥ interchanged.
Now, we say that a constant game A is static iff, for any player ℘, run Γ and ℘-delay ∆ of Γ, the
following two conditions are satisfied:
1. If Γ is not a ℘-illegal run of A, then neither is ∆.
2. If Γ is a ℘-won run of A, then so is ∆.
And a nonconstant game is considered static iff so are all of its instances.
Remark: Another equivalent approach, taken in all earlier papers on CL except [6], only stipulates the
second condition in the definition of static games. That approach, however, assumes existence of a move
♠ that is illegal in every position of every game. As it turns out (Lemma 4.7 of [1]), the first condition
of our present definition of static games is then automatically implied by the second condition, so there is
no need for explicitly stating it. Without stipulating the existence of an always-illegal move, however, both
conditions are necessary.
Our Definition 3.3 of •–≀≀ was limited to finite-depth games. The only reason for adopting this limitation
was the desire to keep things simple, as finite-depth games were sufficient for our present treatment: every
formula of CL12 expresses a finite-depth game, as elementary games are finite-depth, and the operations
¬, ∧ , ∨ , ⊓ , ⊔ ,⊓,⊔, ∀, ∃ (but not •–≀≀ ) preserve the finite-depth property. However, for possible future
needs, in this appendix-style technical section where we no longer care about simplicity, it would not hurt
to generalize •–≀≀ to all games before proving that it preserves the static property of games. The following
definition does this job.
Here are some terminological and notational conventions for Definition 12.1. The predecessor of a
nonempty finite bit string w is the longest proper prefix of w. For a bit string w and run Γ, Γw means the
result of deleting from Γ all labmoves except those that look like ℘u.α for some u  w, and then further
deleting “u.” in each such ℘u.α. Similarly, ΓS. means the result of deleting from Γ all labmoves except those
that look like ℘S.α, and then further deleting “S.” in each such ℘S.α.
Definition 12.1 Let A1, . . . , An and B be constant games, and T a tree of games with yield 〈A1, . . . , An〉
(n ≥ 1). Let w1, . . . , wn be the addresses of A1, . . . , An in T , respectively. The game T •–≀≀ B is defined by:
Lr: Γ is a legal run of T •–≀≀ B iff the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Every labmove of Γ looks like ℘S.β, ⊤w: or ℘w.β, where ℘ is either player, β is a move, and w is
a finite (possibly empty) bit string.
2. Whenever Γ contains ⊤w:, it does not have any other occurrences of the same labmove, and either
w is one of w1, . . . , wn, or the labmove ⊤w: is preceded by ⊤u:,
10 where u is the predecessor of
w. We call labmoves of the form ⊤w: replicative.
3. Whenever Γ contains ℘w.β, either w is a (not necessarily proper) prefix of one of w1, . . . , wn, or
else the labmove ℘w.β is preceded by ⊤u:, where u is the predecessor of w.
4. ΓS. is a legal run of B.
5. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and any infinite bit string u, Γwiu is a legal run of ¬Ai.
Wn: A legal run Γ of T •–≀≀ B is won by ⊤ iff Γ contains only finitely many replicative labmoves, and either
WnB〈ΓS.〉 = ⊤ or, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and some infinite bit string u,11 Wn¬Ai〈Γwiu〉 = ⊤.
It is not hard to see that, when restricted to finite-depth games, the above definition of •–≀≀ is equivalent
to Definition 3.3.
Proposition 12.2 Let A1, . . . , An and B be arbitrary static games, and T be a tree of games with yield
〈A1, . . . , An〉 (n ≥ 1). Then the game T •–≀≀ B is also static.
10Here and below, “preceded” does not mean “immediately preceded”. Rather, it means that Γ looks like 〈. . .⊤u: . . .⊤w: . . .〉.
11In fact, considering only certain “sufficiently long” finite bit strings would do the job here, but why bother.
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Proof. Suppose A1, . . . , An, B and T are as in the assumption of the lemma. We may also safely
assume that the n + 1 games are constant, or else pick an arbitrary valuation e and replace them with
e[A1], . . . , e[An], e[B]. Let ℘ be either player, Γ any run, and ∆ any ℘-delay of Γ.
Verifying the first condition of the definition of static games. Assume ∆ is a ℘-illegal run of T •–≀≀ B. We
want to show that then so is Γ. Below, when we simply say “legal”, “℘-illegal”, etc., we mean (being a)
legal, ℘-illegal, etc. run of T •–≀≀ B.
Let 〈Ψ, ℘α〉 be the shortest ℘-illegal initial segment of ∆. Let 〈Φ, ℘α〉 be the shortest initial segment of
Γ containing all the ℘-labeled moves of 〈Ψ, ℘α〉, and let Θ be the sequence of those ℘-labeled moves of Ψ
that are not in Φ. We obviously have
〈Ψ, ℘α〉 is a ℘-delay of 〈Φ, ℘α,Θ〉. (7)
If Φ is ℘-illegal, then so is Γ and we are done. Assume now that
Φ is not ℘-illegal. (8)
We claim that then
Φ is legal. (9)
Indeed, suppose that this was not the case. Then, by (8), Φ should be ℘-illegal. This would make Γ a ℘-illegal
run with Φ as an illegal initial segment which is shorter than 〈Ψ, ℘α〉. Then, by the induction hypothesis,
any run for which Γ is a ℘-delay, would be ℘-illegal. But the fact that ∆ is a ℘-delay of Γ obviously implies
that Γ is a ℘-delay of ∆ (Lemma 4.6 of [1]). So, ∆ would be ℘-illegal, which is a contradiction because,
according to our assumptions, ∆ is ℘-illegal.
We are continuing our proof. There are five possible reasons to why 〈Ψ, ℘α〉 is ℘-illegal (while Ψ being
legal):
Reason 1: ℘α does not have the form ℘S.β, ⊤w: or ℘w.β. But then, for the same reason, 〈Φ, ℘α〉 is
illegal. This, in view of (9), means that 〈Φ, ℘α〉 is ℘-illegal. Hence Γ, as an extension of 〈Φ, ℘α〉, is also
℘-illegal, as desired.
Reason 2: ℘α is ⊤w:, but it violates condition 2 of the Lr clause of Definition 12.1. It is not hard to see
that then, for the same reason, 〈Φ, ℘α〉 is illegal. This, in turn, as in the previous case, implies that Γ is
℘-illegal.
Reason 3: ℘α is ⊤w.β, but it violates condition 3 of the Lr clause of Definition 12.1. Again, for this very
reason, 〈Φ, ℘α〉 can be seen to be illegal. This, as in the previous cases, implies that Γ is ℘-illegal.
Reason 4: 〈Ψ, ℘α〉S. is an illegal run of B. This means it is a ℘-illegal run of B, because we know that
Ψ is a legal run of T •–≀≀ B. Obviously (7) implies that 〈Ψ, ℘α〉S. is a ℘-delay of 〈Φ, ℘α,Θ〉S.. Hence, as B
is static, 〈Φ, ℘α,Θ〉S. is also a ℘-illegal run of B. From here, taking into account that Θ does not have any
℘-labeled moves, we find that 〈Φ, ℘α〉S. is a ℘-illegal run of B. This, together with (9), obviously implies
that 〈Φ, ℘α〉 is a ℘-illegal run of T •–≀≀ B, and hence so is its extension Γ, as desired.
Reason 5: For some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and some infinite bit string u, 〈Ψ, ℘α〉wiu is not a legal run of ¬Ai.
Fix these i and u. This case is very similar to the previous one. Since Ψ is a legal run of T •–≀≀ B, we
should have that 〈Ψ, ℘α〉wiu is a ℘-illegal run of ¬Ai. Also, (7) implies that 〈Ψ, ℘α〉
wiu is a ℘-delay of
〈Φ, ℘α,Θ〉wiu. Therefore, as Ai and hence ¬Ai are static, 〈Φ, ℘α,Θ〉
wiu is a ℘-illegal run of it. Further
reasoning as in the previous case, we find that 〈Φ, ℘α〉 and hence Γ is a ℘-illegal run of T •–≀≀ B.
Verifying the second condition of the definition of static games. Here, again, when we simply say “legal”,
“℘-illegal”, “℘-won”, etc., we mean (being a) legal, ℘-illegal, ℘-won etc. run of T •–≀≀ B.
Assume Γ is won by ℘. We want to show that then so is ∆.
If ∆ is ℘-illegal, then it is won by ℘ and we are done. So, assume that ∆ is not ℘-illegal. But, as noted
earlier, Γ is a ℘-delay of ∆ and, therefore, in view of the already proven fact that the first condition of the
definition of static games is satisfied, we find that Γ is not ℘-illegal, either. Γ also cannot be ℘-illegal, for
otherwise it would not be won by ℘. Consequently, ∆ cannot be ℘-illegal either, for otherwise Γ would be
℘-illegal. Thus, we have narrowed down our considerations to the case when both Γ and ∆ are legal.
If the reason of Γ’s being won by ℘ is that Γ has infinitely many replicative labmoves and ℘ = ⊥, then
∆ is won by ℘ for exactly the same reason.
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Assume now Γ only has a finite number of replicative labmoves (and hence so does ∆).
Suppose ΓS. is a ⊤-won run of B, so that ℘ (the winner in Γ) is ⊤. ∆’s being a ⊤-delay of Γ implies
that ∆S. is a ⊤-delay of ΓS., and hence, as the latter is a ⊤-won run of the static game B, so is the former.
This, in turn, implies that ∆ is a ⊤-won (i.e., ℘-won) run of T •–≀≀ B, as desired.
Suppose now ΓS. is not a ⊤-won run of B. Then, our assumption that Γ is a ℘-won run of T •–≀≀ B can be
seen to imply that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and each infinite bit string u (if ℘ = ⊥), or some such i and u (if
℘ = ⊤), Γwiu is a ℘-won run of ¬Ai. Taking into account that ∆
wiu is obviously a ℘-delay of Γwiu and
that ¬Ai is static, the above, in turn, implies that for each i and u (if ℘ = ⊥), or some i and u (if ℘ = ⊤),
∆wiu is a ℘-won run of ¬Ai. In addition, if ℘ = ⊥, then ∆
S. is a ℘-won run of B, because so is ΓS., B is
static and ∆S. is a ℘-delay of ΓS.. All this implies the desired conclusion that ∆ is a ℘-won run of T •–≀≀ B.
✷
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